University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Law School

7-2017

Assessing the Viability of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Law School
Admissions
Eboni S. Nelson
University of South Carolina - Columbia, nelsones@law.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eboni Nelson et. al., Assessing the Viability of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Law School Admissions, 102
IOWA L. REV. 2187 (2017).

This Article is brought to you by the Law School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

_SETIWA13.DOTM (DO NOT DELETE)

7/25/2017 11:59 PM

Assessing the Viability of
Race-Neutral Alternatives
in Law School Admissions
Eboni S. Nelson,* Ronald Pitner,** & Carla D. Pratt***
ABSTRACT: Over the past several years, law schools have experienced many
challenges stemming from declines in student enrollment due to a shrinking
applicant pool. The declining number of applicants is particularly
problematic for law schools seeking to educate students in racially diverse
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learning environments. In light of recent challenges to the constitutionality of
race-conscious affirmative action and the likelihood that President Donald
Trump will make several appointments to the Supreme Court—thereby
shifting its balance toward the ideology of colorblindness—it is imperative to
engage in a project that examines the relationship between racial categories
and race-neutral identity factors in law-school admissions. Understanding
the relationship between racial groups and certain race-neutral identity
factors will help law schools comply with Fisher I’s mandate that universities
consider race-neutral means for achieving diversity before using race as a
factor in their admissions processes. Understanding this relationship will also
be useful for higher-education institutions seeking to enroll racially diverse
student bodies in jurisdictions that do not permit the consideration of race in
admissions, and may become necessary for all institutions if the Court
overrules the Fisher and Grutter decisions. Moreover, the data from this
study illuminates persisting structural inequalities for certain racial minority
groups and rebuts the assumption that those privileged enough to make it to
law school are insulated from the structural inequalities that race-conscious
affirmative action historically sought to address.
This empirical study surveyed first-year law students at public American Bar
Association approved law schools and asked them about race-neutral aspects
of their identity, such as family background and educational-institution
characteristics, to determine whether there is a relationship between their race
and certain socioeconomic identity factors. The findings will enhance law
schools’ understanding of race-neutral admissions factors that may contribute
to their abilities to assemble racially diverse student bodies, and will give them
tools to experiment with trying to yield racially diverse classes without asking
applicants about their race. Possessing such knowledge will greatly aid law
schools as they develop and implement admissions policies in their efforts to
provide greater access to students from backgrounds underrepresented in the
legal profession while also fulfilling their commitment to educate all law
students in a diverse learning environment.
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INTRODUCTION

The past several years have been challenging for law schools because
many have experienced declines in student enrollment due to a shrinking
applicant pool.1 The declining number of applicants is particularly
problematic for law schools in their attempts to enroll sufficient numbers of
students to comprise incoming classes without sacrificing the numerical
academic credentials of matriculating students. One such challenge concerns
their efforts to educate students in racially diverse learning environments.2
For several decades, law schools have recognized and actively pursued the
educational and social benefits commonly associated with assembling racially
diverse student bodies.3 In their efforts to enroll diverse classes, they have
implemented strategies ranging from minority-targeted recruitment

1. See Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-ascosts-rise-and-jobs-are-cut.html; Benjamin Wermund, Shrinking Applicant Pool Has Law Schools
Competing to Cut Costs, HOUS. CHRON. (June 1, 2014, 11:06 AM), http://www.houstonchronicle.
com/news/education/article/Shrinking-applicant-pool-has-law-schools-5519781.php.
2. See generally Aaron N. Taylor, Diversity as a Law School Survival Strategy, 59 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 321 (2015).
3. See David Kow, The (Un)compelling Interest for Underrepresented Minority Students: Enhancing
the Education of White Students Underexposed to Racial Diversity, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 157,
159–61 (2010) (discussing the University of Michigan Law School’s theory in Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), that educational benefits from a diverse student body constituted a
compelling interest that met strict scrutiny); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity, Discrimination, and
Equality in the Legal Profession or Who is Responsible for Pursuing Diversity and Why, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1079, 1118 (2011) (discussing law schools that have made a commitment to “formal
diversity”); cf. Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference in Law School Admissions: The Public Interest in a
Diverse Legal Profession, 1 J.L. SOC’Y 17, 18 (1999) (“When racially preferential law school
admissions policies were first adopted in the middle 1960s, the primary purpose for doing so was
not to attain a racially diverse student body in law schools, although the programs had this clearly
desirable educational effect.”).
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programs4 to minority-targeted financial aid.5 Considering applicants’ races
in admissions decisions has been pivotal to these efforts.
Since Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.’s pronouncement in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke approving the limited consideration of race in
higher-education admissions decisions,6 race-conscious affirmative action has
been an invaluable tool by which to provide countless minority students the
opportunity to pursue legal education. As private and public universities have
modeled their admissions programs on Justice Powell’s discussion of
permissible race-conscious policies,7 affirmative action has played a critical
role in diversifying law schools and the legal profession.8 Unfortunately, this
role has diminished significantly due to ballot initiatives such as Proposition
209 in California9 and Proposal 2 in Michigan,10 as well as legal challenges—
most recently, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin (“Fisher I”).11
Despite the effectiveness of race-conscious admissions plans in helping to
provide higher-education opportunities for students of color,12 opponents of
race-conscious affirmative action continue to maintain that such policies

4. See Catherine E. Smith, Seven Principles: Increasing Access to Law School Among Students of
Color, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1689–92 (2011) (discussing pipeline efforts at the University of
Denver Sturm College of Law).
5. See generally Osamudia R. James, Dog Wags Tail: The Continuing Viability of Minority-Targeted
Aid in Higher Education, 85 IND. L.J. 851 (2010); John Nussbaumer & Chris Johnson, The Door to Law
School, 6 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 1, 28–29 (2011); Stephen B. Thomas & Judy L.
Hirschman, Minority-Targeted Scholarships: More than a Black and White Issue, 21 J.C. & U.L. 555 (1995).
6. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (recognizing that in the
context of higher-education admissions, “the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may
be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of
race and ethnic origin”).
7. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323 (2003); see also Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law
Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If the various opinions in Bakke mixed so many
different colors that the result became rather muddy, that result was still clear enough to permit
educators to rely upon the opinion that gave the decision its life and meaning . . . . More
importantly, we are required so to do.”); Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1215, 1223 n.17 (2002) (discussing how Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke shaped
UCLA School of Law’s admissions program and many others prior to Proposition 209).
8. See Jesse Rothstein & Albert H. Yoon, Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do
Racial Preferences Do?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 697 (2008) (concluding “that affirmative action is
responsible for nearly all of the diversity currently seen in the law student population generally
and at every law school of even moderate selectivity”).
9. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
10. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). On June 23, 2016,
the Supreme Court upheld the University of Texas’ race-conscious admissions plan challenged
in Fisher I. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016).
12. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1329 (1986) (“Affirmative action has strikingly benefited blacks as a group
and the nation as a whole. . . . Without affirmative action, continued access for black applicants
to college and professional education would be drastically narrowed. To insist, for example, upon
the total exclusion of racial factors in admission decisions, especially at elite institutions, would
mean classes of college, professional and graduate students that are virtually devoid of Negro
representation.”); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.13 In 2003, the
Supreme Court sanctioned the use of race-conscious admissions policies in
higher education provided that universities adhere to constitutional
standards of strict scrutiny as set forth by the Court.14 A decade later in Fisher
I, the Court reiterated its prior holdings by holding that in order for an
affirmative-action plan to pass constitutional scrutiny, the university
implementing it must seek to achieve a compelling interest and its chosen
means must be narrowly tailored to achieve it.15
The question of whether considering race is necessary for a university to
achieve its diversity goals is of paramount importance to the Court’s narrowly
tailored inquiry.16 According to the Court, utilizing race-conscious admissions
plans is impermissible if an institution of higher education “could achieve
sufficient diversity without using racial classifications.”17 The impact of raceneutral alternatives on the admissions process is central to this inquiry.
Fisher I clarified that the constitutionality of a race-conscious admissions
plan depends upon the reviewing court’s determination “that no workable
race-neutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of
diversity.”18 While some opponents of affirmative action have been quick to
assert that universities have several effective race-neutral alternatives at their
disposal to avoid harms commonly associated with non-diverse learning

13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race,
and state-provided education is no exception.”); id. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the
meddling of university administrators. . . . [and] I wish to see all students succeed whatever their
color . . . .”). See generally Ward Connerly, It Is Time to End Race-Based “Affirmative Action”, 1 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 56 (2007); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 729 (2015).
14. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that universities’ raceconscious admissions policies must be “narrowly tailored to achieve the interest in educational
diversity”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (sanctioning the “narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body.”).
15. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419–20.
16. Id. at 2420.
17. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
18. Id.
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environments,19 very little empirical evidence substantiates this claim.20
Rather, several studies have shown that eliminating race-conscious affirmative
action would result in dramatic declines in the acceptance and enrollment
rates for African–American21 and Hispanic applicants, especially at highly
selective institutions. Researchers Thomas Espenshade and Chang Chung
found that elite institutions that discontinued their use of affirmative action
would affect undergraduate admissions significantly:
Acceptance rates for African-American candidates would fall from
33.7 percent to 12.2 percent, a decline of almost two-thirds, and the
proportion of African-American students in the admitted class would
drop from 9.0 to 3.3 percent. The acceptance rate for Hispanic
applicants would be cut in half—from 26.8 percent to 12.9 percent,
and Hispanics would comprise just 3.8 of all admitted students
versus an actual proportion of 7.9 percent.22

19. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 361–62, 367–71, (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (suggesting that universities try various race-neutral “admissions methods[] such as
accepting all students who meet minimum qualifications,” decreasing reliance on standardized test
scores, and employing percent plans instead of relying on affirmative action to diversify their student
body); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8–9, 13–21, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) 2003 WL 176635, at *8–9, *13–21 (arguing that the
University of Michigan School of Law’s race-conscious admissions policy was unconstitutional due
to the availability of “ample race-neutral alternatives” by which to diversify its student body); Joshua
P. Thompson & Damien M. Schiff, Divisive Diversity at the University of Texas: An Opportunity for the
Supreme Court to Overturn Its Flawed Decision in Grutter, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 437, 473 (2011)
(asserting that the University of Texas’ “race-neutral plan has been a demonstrable success”); L.
Darnell Weeden, Employing Race-Neutral Affirmative Action to Create Educational Diversity While Attacking
Socio-Economic Status Discrimination, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 297, 334 (2005) (advocating
for the Supreme Court’s reconsideration of Grutter “[b]ecause the conceptual framework for
effective race-neutral educational diversity demonstrated by the success of the Texas Top Ten
Percent Plan could be designed to create true educational diversity based on socio-economic
status”); Stephen Blea, Comment, The End of Affirmative Action: The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to
Overrule Grutter, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1085, 1090–112 (2013) (discussing the Texas Top Ten
Percent Plan as an effective race-neutral alternative to the University of Texas’ race-conscious
admissions plan in Fisher I).
20. One recent study suggests that a class-based affirmative-action plan may be able to
maintain existing levels of racial diversity on a moderately selective public-university campus, if
the institution structures it to account for both disadvantage and overachievement. Matthew N.
Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 367,
379 (2013) (showing a class-based affirmative-action policy at the University of Colorado yielded
underrepresented minority students at rates comparable to those produced by race-conscious
affirmative-action policies).
21. The authors recognize that the term “black” is more inclusive and encompasses all
people of African descent regardless of their ethnicity. For purposes of this study and this Article,
we collapsed all participants reporting African ancestry into a single racial group and refer to
them by using the terms black and African–American interchangeably. Bi-racial and multi-racial
participants in the study who reported some African ancestry were excluded from the
Black/African–American category in an effort not to privilege one component of their identity
over the other(s). We also use the terms Hispanic and Latina/o interchangeably herein.
22. Thomas J. Espenshade & Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at
Elite Universities, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 293, 298 (2005).
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Their results were consistent with other researchers’ findings predicting steep
declines in racial diversity if universities discontinue their use of raceconscious admissions policies.23
Researchers have also made similar predictions in the context of legal
education. After examining 1990–1991 application and decision data for over
90,000 applicants to 173 American Bar Association (“ABA”) approved law
schools, Professor Linda Wightman found that there would be “a substantial
reduction in the overall number of applicants of color who were offered
admission to ABA-approved law schools” if the schools abandoned raceconscious affirmative action.24 After replicating the study using 2000–2001
data, Wightman concluded that if law schools stopped considering race in
admissions, minority student representation would experience substantial
reductions.25
Indeed, there have been substantial declines in the number of students
of color attending law schools—particularly those that are highly selective—
which have discontinued race-conscious affirmative action, despite
implementing race-neutral alternatives.26 Following the 1995 adoption of a
Board of Regents resolution prohibiting University of California (“UC”)

23. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 15–52 (1998);
Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College
Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
101, 101–56 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004); Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in
College Admissions, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 431–56 (Christopher Jencks &
Meredith Phillips eds., 1998); Victor B. Saenz et al., Losing Ground? Exploring Racial/Ethnic
Enrollment Shifts in Freshman Access to Selective Institutions, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES, CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 79, 95 (Gary
Orfield et al. eds., 2007); David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action
in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1857
(2005); Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A “Workable, Race-Neutral Alternative” to Affirmative Action?, 39
J.C. & U.L. 127, 142–48 (2013); Mark C. Long, College Applications and the Effect of Affirmative
Action, 121 J. ECONOMETRICS 319, 319–42 (2004); Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 8, at 652.
24. Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the
Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
14 (1997).
25. Linda F. Wightman, The Consequences of Race-Blindness: Revisiting Prediction Models with
Current Law School Data, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 229, 251 (2003). Wightman’s replication of the study
using 2009–2010 data suggests similar conclusions regarding the detrimental impact of
discontinuing the use of affirmative action in law-school admissions. LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS
COUNS., UPDATED WIGHTMAN RACE-BLIND ADMISSION MODEL RESULTS: 2009–2010 APPLICANT
DATA 1–2 (Aug. 2012), http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/publications-(lsac-resources)/
raceblindadmissionresults.pdf.
26. Kevin R. Johnson & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Cry Me a River: The Limits of “A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools,” 7 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 9–10 (2005);
Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1,
11 (2001); Carmina Ocampo, Prop 209: Ten Long Years, NATION (Nov. 22, 2006), https://www.
thenation.com/article/prop-209-ten-long-years; Julie J. Park, Black Men at UCLA: The Devastating Effects
of Proposition 209, HUFFINGTON POST: BLOG (Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-jpark/black-men-at-ucla-the-dev_b_4297110.html; Erica Perez, Despite Diversity Efforts, UC Minority
Enrollment Down Since Prop. 209, CAL. WATCH (Feb. 24, 2012), http://californiawatch.org/dailyreport/
despite-diversity-efforts-uc-minority-enrollment-down-prop-209-15031.
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schools from considering race in admission decisions and the 1996 passage
of Proposition 209 banning affirmative action in California, the percentage
of underrepresented minority students at UC Berkeley Law School
(“Berkeley”) declined from 25% in 1993 to 12% in 2005.27 UC Los Angeles
School of Law (“UCLA”) experienced similar declines as its percentage of
underrepresented minority students decreased from 32% in 1994 to 11% in
2005, despite implementing race-neutral measures such as class-based
affirmative action and new recruitment strategies.28 In 2014, neither Berkeley
nor UCLA successfully enrolled the percentages of underrepresented
minority students they had previously achieved in 1993.29
Similar declines in racial diversity occurred at the University of Michigan
Law School (“Michigan”) following the 2006 passage of Proposal 2, a state
ballot initiative banning state universities from considering race in their
admissions. In 2006, prior to Proposal 2, African–American students
comprised 6.8% of Michigan’s first-year class.30 In 2008, the percentage
decreased to 3.9%.31 Although the percentage of African–American first-year
students increased to 4.7% in 2014, the overall percentage of
African–American students at Michigan during the same year was only 3.6%.32
Such declines in minority student enrollment evidence the difficulties
that universities and law schools face as they endeavor to implement effective
race-neutral alternatives so that students can realize the educational benefits
of diversity. This study, which examines the relationship between the race of
law students and their race-neutral identity factors, seeks to assist law schools
in this endeavor. The findings of our study identify some race-neutral identity
factors that align closely with race, such that a law school could experiment
with them to determine whether it could achieve a racially-diverse class
without asking applicants about their race.

27. Helen Hyun, Falling Sky: Trends in Minority Access to Law Schools, Pre- and Post-Gratz and
Grutter, in CHARTING THE FUTURE OF COLLEGE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: LEGAL VICTORIES,
CONTINUING ATTACKS, AND NEW RESEARCH 105, 114–15 (Gary Orfield et al. eds., 2007).
28. Id.
29. In 2014, Berkeley’s student body was comprised of 12.3% Hispanic students, 4.4%
African–American students, and .4% American Indian students. UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY - 2014 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Std509InfoReport_2014.pdf. During the same year, UCLA’s
enrollment was comprised of only 9.6% Hispanic students, 3.5% African–American students, and
.9% American Indian students. UNIV. OF CAL., L.A., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES - 2014
STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20150905181002/
http://www.law.ucla.edu/~/media/Assets/Admissions/Documents/Std509InfoReport-9-10-1202-2014%2013-11-58.ashx.
30. Greg Stohr, Black Enrollment Falls as Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
23, 2013, 9:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-24/black-enrollmentfalls-as-michigan-rejects-affirmative-action.
31. Id.
32. UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 2014 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1
(2014), http://www.law.umich.edu/aboutus/Documents/Std509InfoReport-76-76-12-12-2014%
2015-31-56.pdf.
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Building on prior research examining racial diversity in legal
education,33 this study surveyed first-year law students attending a crosssection of public34 ABA approved law school.35 The participants were asked
about various aspects of their backgrounds related to educational experiences
and family circumstances. The study compared students’ responses to their
self-identified racial categories to determine the relationship between
students’ race and race-neutral identity factors.
The findings presented herein suggest that considering certain raceneutral factors may equip law schools with a means to test whether they could
use race-neutral admissions to assemble racially diverse classes.36 Because
African–American and Hispanic students are significantly more likely than

33. See generally Walter R. Allen & Daniel Solórzano, Affirmative Action, Educational Equity and
Campus Racial Climate: A Case Study of the University of Michigan Law School, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA
L.J. 237 (2001); Meera E. Deo et al., Paint by Number? How the Race and Gender of Law School Faculty
Affect the First-Year Curriculum, 29 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 1 (2010); Meera E. Deo, The
Promise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University of Michigan Law School, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L.
63 (2011); Meera E. Deo et al., Struggles & Support: Diversity in U.S. Law Schools, 23 NAT’L BLACK
L.J. 71 (2010); Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt
Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241 (2000); Rothstein & Yoon, supra note 8; Richard H. Sander, A Systemic
Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004); see also generally
CHARLES E. DAYE ET AL., LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY PROJECT:
ANALYSIS OF LONGITUDINAL AND CONCURRENT STUDENT AND FACULTY DATA (2010), http://www.
lsac.org/docs/default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/gr-10-01.pdf.
34. For the purposes of this study, a “public” law school is a law school that is situated within
a broader university structure that legislative action created, and receives an annual funding
appropriation from a government.
35. The study focuses on ABA approved law schools because the ABA Council on Legal
Education, the accrediting body for law schools, imposes a diversity standard that all law schools
must satisfy. Consequently, ABA approved law schools have a need to be concerned with diversity
in the student body in order to be in compliance with ABA regulations. ABA Standard 206, which
governs diversity and inclusion, provides:
(a)
Consistent with sound legal education policy and the Standards, a law school
shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by
providing full opportunities for the study of law and entry into the profession by
members of underrepresented groups, particularly racial and ethnic minorities, and
a commitment to having a student body that is diverse with respect to gender, race,
and ethnicity.
(b)
Consistent with sound educational policy and the Standards, a law school
shall demonstrate by concrete action a commitment to diversity and inclusion by
having a faculty and staff that are diverse with respect to gender, race, and ethnicity.
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
2015–2016, at 12 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/
legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_schools_final.
authcheckdam.pdf.
36. See infra Parts V and VI. Not all law schools are similarly situated. Some draw students from
local regions while others have a very diverse applicant pool. Moreover, applicant pools change from
year to year. Consequently, the tools provided by the findings of this study might work to aid some
law schools in achieving a racially diverse student body while at the same time fail to achieve racial
diversity at other law schools. Likewise, the tool could work at a law school for while then cease to
be effective if there are significant changes in the applicant pool. For this reason, it is important for
law schools to test the viability of the methodology in the study rather than assuming that it will yield
a critical mass of students from groups underrepresented in law school.
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white students to endorse race-neutral factors such as qualifying for free or
reduced lunch during elementary and secondary school, receiving a Pell
Grant during college, and having a parent or guardian who received public
assistance while he or she was growing up,37 law schools’ consideration of
these and similar factors in their admissions decisions may be a useful way for
law schools to test, in a single admission cycle, whether using race-neutral
means is sufficient to achieve their diversity goals. A law school could ask
questions on its application regarding these race-neutral identity factors and
weight them in the admissions process.38 In so doing, the law school would
effectively expand the definition of merit beyond academic credentials to
include applicants who have demonstrated determination to overcome
structural challenges. Redefining merit in this way could help ensure that the
enrolling class would be diverse, because not all applicants would have
demonstrated merit merely through their Law School Admission Test
(“LSAT”) score and undergraduate grade point average (“UGPA”).
Moreover, an admissions standard that seeks to admit students who have
overcome structural inequality strikes at the heart of what proponents
originally intended race-conscious affirmative action to do.
This Article reports on research that provides law schools with tools by
which to experiment with race-neutral admissions. The research was confined
to 10 law schools. Consequently, it does not claim that all law schools, or any
law school, will be able to assemble a racially diverse class using race-neutral
admissions. Instead, it argues that law schools now have some data to use for
experimenting with a race-neutral admissions cycle as a means of complying
with Fisher I’s mandate that schools seriously consider race-neutral alternatives
before resorting to the use of race.39
It is important to note that although the study found statistically
significant relationships between race and certain race-neutral identity
factors, this Article does not advocate for the wholesale substitution of
traditional race-conscious admissions measures with them. Rather, it
encourages law schools to utilize such race-neutral factors in their admissions
processes as a means of complying with Fisher I and testing the viability of raceneutral measures. Also, because there were some schools in our sample that
37. See infra Part IV.
38. Admittedly, these types of questions are very personal in nature, and some applicants
might not wish to answer them. Consequently, we recommend that law schools make the
questions optional and explain why they are being asked. For example, the application could
state: We define merit by looking beyond LSAT scores and UGPAs to ascertain whether candidates for
admission have overachieved relative to the advantages or disadvantages they have experienced. If you want
the admissions committee to consider your achievements pursuant to this more thorough assessment, please
answer the following questions.
39. Experimentation might take the form of a race-neutral admissions cycle, but for those
law schools that do not wish to risk experiencing a loss of diversity, the experimentation could be
done by conducting a parallel phantom race-neutral admission cycle with all or a random portion
of the applicant pool to compare the outcome of a race-neutral approach with the outcome of a
race-conscious approach. If the race-conscious approach produced significantly more racial
diversity than the race-neutral approach, the law school would know that it should not attempt a
race-neutral admission because considering race was necessary to achieve a racially diverse class.
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had very low levels of racial diversity, a race-neutral admission cycle might
increase the percentages of students from underrepresented racial groups by
eliminating implicit bias that may be operating in some admissions processes
effectively to stop admissions of applicants from underrepresented groups
once there appears to be a critical mass of non-white students. On the other
hand, schools with such little diversity that there is no critical mass of any
underrepresented racial group may find that their diversity suffers even more
when they eliminate racial considerations from their admissions decisions.
Consequently, each law school must conduct its own mini-study to determine
whether using race-neutral admissions would sustain or improve diversity
there. It is our hope that this study provides some tools for law schools to use
to engage in such experimentation.
Experimenting with a race-neutral admission cycle could expand
educational opportunities for students of color at some law schools while also
addressing opponents’ and proponents’ concerns that current affirmativeaction policies violate the Constitution40 and/or disproportionately benefit
privileged minority students from middle- and high-class backgrounds.41
Based on the sample of participants in our study, it is clear that privilege did
not catapult many law students of color to law school. Many of them had to
overcome the structural inequalities of public education, poverty, and race to
make it to law school. Expanding opportunities for these and other minority
students will benefit not only legal education and the legal profession, but
also society more broadly.
Part II briefly examines the current state of racial diversity in ABA
approved law schools. It discusses the historical underrepresentation of
certain minority groups in law school, which has led to a profound lack of
racial diversity in the legal profession. Part III discusses the constitutional
landscape governing the use of race-conscious affirmative action in higher
education. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Fisher I, this Part
explains why empirically examining the availability and viability of raceneutral measures to achieve student-body diversity is an important and
necessary endeavor.
Part IV examines the Texas Ten Percent Plan as a race-conscious model
of race neutrality and describes the study’s design and methodology. Part V
presents our study’s descriptive and inferential findings. Based on these
findings, Part VI offers observations and suggestions to aid law schools as they
develop and implement admissions policies to provide greater access to
students from backgrounds that are underrepresented in the legal profession.
40.
41.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 80 (1991);
CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 250–51, 260–62 (2004); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social
Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1476–77 (2005);
Sheryll Cashin, Place, Not Race: Affirmative Action and the Geography of Educational Opportunity, 47 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 935, 940–41 (2014); Mark Nadel, Retargeting Affirmative Action: A Program to
Serve Those Most Harmed by Past Racism and Avoid Intractable Problems Triggered by Per Se Racial
Preferences, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 323, 325–27 (2006).
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Engaging in this endeavor will help law schools fulfill their commitment and
obligation to educate all law students in a diverse learning environment.
II.

THE DIVERSITY DILEMMA IN LAW SCHOOLS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Like other post-baccalaureate degree-granting institutions,42 law schools
have experienced an overall increase in racial diversity over the past several
decades. From 1971 to 2014, the total enrollment of minority students in ABA
approved law schools increased from 6.1% to 26.9%.43 Similarly, the
percentage of Juris Doctor (“JD”) degrees awarded to minority students
increased from 8.6% to 25.5% between 1983 and 2013.44 While these
statistics are significant achievements, a closer examination of diversity in law
schools and the legal profession reveals disconcerting realities that counter
the beneficial promise of these figures.
Consider, for instance, the percentage of historically underrepresented
minority students, such as African–Americans and Hispanics,45 who attend the

42. From 1976 to 2013, the percentage of racial/ethnic minority U.S. residents enrolled in
degree-granting post-baccalaureate institutions increased from 10.4% to 33.5%. Table 306.10:
Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions, by Level of Enrollment, Sex, Attendance
Status, and Race/ethnicity of Student: Selected Years, 1976 through 2013, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_306.10.asp (last visited
Apr. 20, 2017).
43. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA APPROVED 1ST YEAR JD AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT: FALL 2013,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_
to_the_bar/statistics/2013_jd_enrollment_1yr_total_minority_.xls (last visited Apr. 20, 2017); AM.
BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/market_research/lawyer-demographics-tables-2016.pdf (last visited Mar. 13, 2017).
44. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA APPROVED TOTAL JD AND MINORITY DEGREES AWARDED: FALL 2013,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_
to_the_bar/statistics/2013_jd_degrees_minority.xls (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
45. Although discussing racial diversity broadly encompasses members of all racial and
ethnic minority groups, university administrators, jurists, scholars, and policymakers often refer
“to the inclusion of students from groups which have been historically discriminated against, like
African-Americans, Hispanics and Native Americans,” when discussing policies affecting
underrepresented minority students. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (internal
citations omitted). As noted by Judge Henry Ramsey, Jr.:
Blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans experience poorer health and substantially
lower levels of health care, fewer high school and college graduates, a greater
percentage of high school drop outs, an Internet gap, higher rates of
unemployment, higher arrest rates, higher criminal convictions and incarceration
rates, higher rates of teen-age pregnancy, higher levels of family poverty, lower home
ownership rates, and lower levels of savings and investment in securities than white
Americans . . . . I have no doubt that these are continuing consequences of centuries
of American racism, and, particularly, the horrific discrimination that occurred in
the United States during the first six decades of the Twentieth Century.
Henry Ramsey, Jr., Response to Dean Herma H. Kay’s Affirmative Action Paper, 34 IND. L. REV. 87, 89
(2000). For thought-provoking discussions regarding the beneficiaries of affirmative action,
particularly within the black community, see generally Kevin Brown & Jeannine Bell, Demise of the
Talented Tenth: Affirmative Action and the Increasing Underrepresentation of Ascendant Blacks at Selective
Higher Educational Institutions, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1230 (2008) (discussing how “blacks whose
predominate ancestry is traceable to the historical oppression of blacks in the United States are
likely more underrepresented in affirmative action than most administrators, admissions
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country’s highest-ranked law schools, as determined by U.S. News & World
Report. In 2014, the African–American enrollment at each of the top fifteen
law schools did not reach 9%.46 Harvard Law School’s (“Harvard’s”)
enrollment was the highest at 8.7%, while Michigan’s African–American
enrollment was the lowest at 3.6%.47 For the 2015–2016 academic year, the
African–American enrollment at Harvard and Michigan increased to 9%48 and 4%,49
respectively. At Yale Law School (“Yale”), which is consistently ranked as the top law school
in the country,50 African–American enrollment decreased from 6.9% in 2014 to 6.2% in
2015.51
Sadly, the Hispanic enrollment at these and other highly selective law
schools is similarly low. During the 2015–2016 academic year, Hispanic
students accounted for 8.3% of Yale’s student body52 and 9.2% of Harvard’s.53
The Hispanic enrollment at Michigan during the same academic year was only
3.7%.54 Therefore, although the total minority enrollment at these and other
top-ranked schools may be as high as 32.9% largely due to Asian student
enrollment, as was the case at Yale during the 2015–2016 academic year,55 the
enrollment of traditionally underrepresented minority students continues to
be disproportionately low at law schools throughout the country. This
unfortunate reality detrimentally impacts not only the law schools but also the
legal profession more broadly.
In recent years, minority law students across the country have fervently
voiced their concerns regarding issues related to the lack of diversity and
inclusion on their campuses. The scope of their concerns has included the
lack of student, faculty, and staff diversity; law schools’ failure to adequately
include the perspectives of communities of color in the presentation and

committees, or faculties may realize”); and Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks,
60 VAND. L. REV. 1138 (2007) (analyzing the generational admission statistics of black students).
46. Ranking the Top Law Schools by Their Percentage of Black Students, J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC.
(Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.jbhe.com/2014/12/ranking-the-top-law-schools-by-their-percentage-ofblack-students [hereinafter Ranking the Top Law Schools].
47. See id. (showing Top Law School Rankings).
48. HARVARD LAW SCH., HARVARD LAW SCHOOL - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1
(2015), http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2015/12/2015-ABA-Standard-509-Report.pdf.
49. UNIV. OF MICH., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1
(2015), http://www.law.umich.edu/aboutus/Documents/Std509InfoReport-76-76-12-17-2015_
12-57-08.pdf.
50. See Derek Tam, Briefly: Law School Tops U.S. News Rankings—Again, YALE DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 24, 2009), http://yaledailynews.com/blog/2009/04/24/briefly-law-school-tops-u-s-newsrankings-again (reporting that U.S. News & World Report has ranked Yale No. 1 every year since it
began ranking law schools in 1983).
51. See Ranking the Top Law Schools, supra note 46; YALE UNIV., YALE UNIVERSITY - 2014
STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2014), http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org; YALE
UNIV., YALE UNIVERSITY - 2015 STANDARD 509 INFORMATION REPORT 1 (2015), http://www.
abarequireddisclosures.org.
52. See YALE UNIV., supra note 51, at 1.
53. HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 48, at 1.
54. UNIV. OF MICH., supra note 49, at 1.
55. See YALE UNIV., supra note 51, at 1.
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discussion of course material; and schools’ utilization of offensive institutional
symbols.56 Many students of color, particularly African–American law
students, have felt isolated and pressured to be “spokespersons for their race”
due, in part, to the lack of diversity on their campuses.57 Considering that
these are precisely the feelings that schools intend diverse learning
environments to combat,58 recent student accounts demonstrate the failure
of some law schools to enroll a sufficient number of minority students to
achieve this goal successfully.
While the lack of meaningful racial diversity in any educational setting is
troubling, it is especially problematic when it occurs at highly selective elite
colleges and law schools. As the Supreme Court recognized in Grutter v.
Bollinger, the most selective higher-education institutions play a critical role in
educating those citizens who are likely to become the nation’s future
leaders.59 This is particularly true “when it comes to highly selective law
schools” because they can serve as gateways to the country’s most prominent
governmental and legal professional positions.60
As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in Grutter, “[a] handful of these
schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States
Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States
District Court judges.”61 In addition, the vast majority of tenured and tenuretrack professors in the legal academy typically graduate from a small subset of

56. See Jordan Raymond, Why I’m Sleeping in Belinda Hall, HARV. CRIMSON (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/3/4/raymond-belinda-hall-protest (detailing students’
concerns at Harvard Law School); Terrell Jermaine Starr, Black Washington And Lee Law Students Say
They Were ‘Bamboozled’ About School’s Diversity, NEWSONE, https://newsone.com/3005288/blackwashington-and-lee-law-students-say-they-were-bamboozled-about-schools-diversity (last visited Apr. 20,
2017) (reporting students’ concerns at Washington and Lee University School of Law); Samantha
Tomilowitz & Sam Hoff, UCLA Law Students Protest Lack of Diversity, DAILY BRUIN (Feb. 10, 2014, 4:10
PM), http://dailybruin.com/2014/02/10/ucla-law-students-protest-lack-of-diversity (discussing
students’ concerns at UCLA School of Law).
57. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318–19 (2003); see also Tomilowitz & Hoff, supra note 56.
58. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013) (“The
attainment of a diverse student body . . . serves values beyond race alone, including enhanced
classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes.”); Grutter, 539 U.S. at
318–19 (discussing a university official’s testimony concerning practices meant to ensure “that
underrepresented minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race”);
Vinay Harpalani, The Double-Consciousness of Race-Consciousness and the Bermuda Triangle of University
Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 821, 832 n.41 (2015) (discussing university efforts to create a
“critical mass”).
59. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (discussing the importance of diversity in the “country’s . . .
most selective [educational] institutions’” to facilitate “a highly qualified, racially diverse [military]
officer corps” (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 29, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516),
2003 WL 1787554, at *29)); id. at 332 (“Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools,
represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders.”).
60. Id. at 332.
61. Id.
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highly ranked law schools,62 most notably Harvard and Yale.63 Considering
that “underrepresented minority graduates of elite U.S. law schools . . . have
strongly disproportionate leadership contributions (relative to other law
schools) in the ranks of corporate law firm partners, the professoriate and the
federal judiciary,”64 the lack of racial diversity in these schools and law schools
more broadly has led to a lack of diversity in many facets of the legal
profession.65
Recently, Professor Deborah Rhode has described law as “one of the least
racially diverse professions in the nation.”66 Despite the nearly 29% of
minority students enrolled in law school during the 2013–2014 academic
year,67 lawyers of color account for only 12% of the profession in 2010.68 The
percentages are even lower at the higher echelons of the legal profession,
where only 9% of general counsels at large corporations and 7% of law-firm
partners are minority attorneys.69 People of color are also underrepresented in
legal academia, where roughly 85% of male tenured professors and 77% of female
tenured professors are white.70

62. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Importance of Student and Faculty Diversity in Law Schools: One
Dean’s Perspective, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1549, 1559 (2011) (identifying a degree from an elite law
school as a desired credential for law schools seeking to hire new professors); Richard E. Redding,
“Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and Its Implications for Legal
Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 594–95 (2003) (discussing the historical and accelerating
trend of law faculties hiring graduates “from a handful of elite law schools”); L. Darnell Weeden,
Back to the Future: Should Grutter’s Diversity Rationale Apply to Faculty Hiring? Is Title VII Implicated?,
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 511, 534 (2005) (discussing elite law schools’ desire to hire faculty
members with similar elite academic credentials).
63. See Justin McCrary et al., The Ph.D. Rises in American Law Schools, 1960-2011: What Does It
Mean for Legal Education?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543, 554 (2016); Redding, supra note 62, at 606–07.
64. William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39
J.C. & U.L. 53, 119 (2013); see also Chambers et al., supra note 23, at 1866 (noting that “the
earnings of graduates of lower-tier schools are in general much lower than the earnings of the
graduates of elite schools”); Johnson, supra note 62, at 1559 (“Many law schools aggressively
recruit minority faculty candidates, with the competition especially keen for those with the most
elite credentials.”).
65. See Johnson & Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 26, at 8 (“Severe underrepresentation of
minorities can be found in legal education, the bar, and judiciary.”); Weeden, supra note 62, at
539 (observing that law schools’ requirement of elite academic credentials for faculty hires will
produce “social barriers that unnecessarily promote racial and ethnic stratification”).
66. Deborah L. Rhode, Law is the Least Diverse Profession in the Nation. And Lawyers Aren’t Doing
Enough to Change That., WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/posteverything/wp/2015/05/27/law-is-the-least-diverse-profession-in-the-nation-and-lawyersarent-doing-enough-to-change-that/?utm_term=.d480280076f0. But see generally Jason P. Nance & Paul
E. Madsen, An Empirical Analysis of Diversity in the Legal Profession, 47 CONN. L. REV. 271 (2014) (finding
that although racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in the legal profession, the profession
is on par with other professions when it comes to diversity).
67. See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS YEAR 2016, supra note 43.
68. See id.; Rhode, supra note 66 (explaining that 88% of lawyers are White).
69. Rhode, supra note 66.
70. AM. BAR ASS’N, DATA FROM THE 2013 ANNUAL QUESTIONNAIRE: ABA APPROVED LAW SCHOOL
STAFF AND FACULTY MEMBERS, GENDER AND ETHNICITY: FALL 2013 (2013), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dah/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statitstics/2013
_law_school_staff_gender_ethnicity.xlsx; see also Meera E. Deo, Looking Forward to Diversity in Legal
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Although legal scholars and practitioners often cite to a “pool problem”
to explain the lack of racial diversity among their ranks71—a claim that is
highly debatable72—increasing racial diversity in law schools would be an
important first step in helping eliminate the stark racial disparities that
currently plague the legal profession. Historically, affirmative action has
served as an invaluable tool by which to diversify law schools.73 However, as
the next Part details, the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin cautions law schools’ continual reliance on the use of race in
admissions without sufficient justification for employing such measures.74
III.

ACHIEVING DIVERSITY THEN AND NOW
A. THE BAKKE GUIDEPOST

For several decades, institutions of higher education—including law
schools—have recognized the social and educational benefits that
commentators commonly associate with diverse learning environments.75
Such benefits range from promoting greater understanding between students
of different races76 to legitimizing our democracy and its leaders.77 In their
efforts to achieve these and other diversity-begotten benefits, colleges and
universities have employed a wide variety of measures to assemble racially
diverse student bodies.78 Realizing that “[t]he tools for constructing the pool
of potential applicants are indissolubly linked to the goal of constructing a
Academia, 29 BERKELEY J. GENDER, L. & JUST. 352, 357 (2014) (stating that, in 2014, at least 72% of law
faculty members were white); Weeden, supra note 62, at 513–14 (citing statistics showing low minority
representation on law school faculties).
71. See Rhode, supra note 66 (reporting that surveyed attorneys “attributed the underrepresentation of minorities to the lack of candidates in the pool”).
72. See Deo, supra note 70, at 359–64 (rejecting the claim that the lack of minority female
law professors is due to a non-diverse pool of applicants); Rhode, supra note 66 (challenging the
“pool problem” contention and attributing minority lawyers’ high rates of attrition in law firms
to several factors such as unconscious bias and lack of mentoring, networking and clientdevelopment opportunities).
73. See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.
74. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1130, 1144–46 (2013);
Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity
Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425, 446–49 (2014); Eboni S. Nelson, Examining the Costs of Diversity,
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 586–92 (2009).
76. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003); see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The
Diversity Paradox: Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L. REV.
EN BANC 113, 129–32 (2012) (discussing university administrators’ challenges in ensuring that
cross-racial understanding actually takes place on diverse campuses).
77. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332; see also Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism:
Confronting the Reality of Our Inequality, 66 MERCER L. REV. 577, 607–08 (2015) (discussing the
aspirational goal of democratic legitimacy as embedded within the diversity rationale).
78. See generally OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO DIVERSITY (2003), https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/ERIC-ED475547/pdf/ERIC-ED475547.pdf (discussing a variety of race-neutral
developmental and admissions programs utilized by colleges and universities in their attempts to
diversify their student bodies).
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diverse learning environment,”79 institutions have attempted to increase the
number of minority applicants to their schools by establishing regional
admissions offices in minority-populated cities and dispatching recruiters to
predominantly minority high schools and colleges.80 They have also offered
minority-targeted financial aid in the forms of race-conscious and raceexclusive awards to encourage students of color to attend their schools.81
Although these and similar programs have been and continue to be
integral in diversifying higher education,82 institutional employment of raceconscious affirmative action has been one of the most effective measures for
assembling a diverse student body.83 By considering an applicant’s race as one
of many factors when making admissions decisions, universities directly
capture those students whose life experiences have been shaped, in part, by
their identity as a racial minority. The unique experiences and perspectives
that these students bring into the academic environment are vital to
universities achieving the educational benefits of diversity. Therefore,
proponents of affirmative action rely upon this diversity rationale to justify the
use of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education.84
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell first articulated the diversity
rationale nearly 40 years ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.85
Although the Court invalidated the University of California at Davis Medical
School’s (“Medical School’s”) separate admissions program for minority

79. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Ledge, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1599 (2003).
80. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, CIVIL RTS. PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV. PERCENT
PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES 55 (2003),
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-collegeadmissions-a-comparative-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf.
81. See James, supra note 5, at 854 (distinguishing between race-conscious aid that considers
race “as one of many factors . . . in selecting award recipients” and race-exclusive aid that “limit[s]
aid eligibility to applicants from a minority racial or ethnic group”). Colleges and universities
have also employed race-neutral financial aid programs, such as the Longhorn Scholars Program
implemented at the University of Texas following the Fifth Circuit’s ban on affirmative action in
Hopwood v. Texas, to assemble a racially diverse student body. Torres, supra note 79, at 1604. As
Professor Gerald Torres noted, “[b]ecause most students of color in Texas tend to come from
poor high schools, poor school districts, and poor families with less-educated providers, the
scholarship program has successfully increased the number of African American and Mexican
American applicants.” Id.
82. See Torres, supra note 79, at 1599 (“Activities like outreach, recruitment, and financial
aid are critical to” maximizing diversity at colleges and universities.).
83. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic
Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1768 (2004) (“Affirmative action has been
the most effective method, and generally the only effective method, of desegregating schools with
highly selective admission standards . . . .”); Ramsey, supra note 45, at 89 (“Affirmative action has
been demonstrated to be one of the most effective means for overcoming barriers to higher
education that are presented by the continuing consequences of racial discrimination.”).
84. See James, supra note 75, at 431–32 (“The diversity rationale—the defense of affirmative
action policies based on a compelling interest in diversity—thus justifies the use of race-conscious
policies in pursuit of this worthy goal.”).
85. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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applicants,86 Justice Powell wrote separately to endorse its goal of attaining a
diverse student body,87 which he clearly found to be “a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”88 According to Justice
Powell, a university exercises its academic freedom, which is grounded in the
First Amendment, when it seeks to assemble a student body comprised of
diverse people with diverse perspectives who can contribute to the vigorous
exchange of ideas that take place on college campuses.89 This freedom,
however, is not limitless, and higher-education institutions must exercise it in
a constitutionally permissible manner,90 which the Medical School failed to
do by implementing a separate admissions procedure that included a
prescribed number of seats in each class only for ethnic minority students.91
In critiquing the Medical School’s program, Justice Powell outlined the
features of a university’s admissions plan that lawfully considers race in its
efforts to achieve the compelling interest of student-body diversity within the
contours of strict scrutiny.92 Such features include considering race or
ethnicity as one of a “broader array of qualifications and characteristics,”93
individualized consideration of all applicants in comparison with each
other,94 and no “fixed number of places to a minority group.”95 Although
some argue that Justice Powell expressed his own views and not necessarily
those of the Court,96 university administrators seized upon his discussion and
modeled their own race-conscious admissions programs on his opinion.97
Bakke’s role as a guidepost for universities seeking to diversify their student
bodies continued for 25 years, until the Court officially sanctioned affirmative

86. Id. at 320.
87. Id. at 311–15.
88. Id. at 311–12.
89. Id. at 312–13.
90. Id. at 314 (“Although a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive
judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights
may not be disregarded.”).
91. See id. at 315; see also id. at 320 (“The fatal flaw in petitioner’s preferential program is its
disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
92. Id. at 315–19.
93. Id. at 315.
94. Id. at 317 (“In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be deemed
a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats.” (footnote omitted)).
95. Id. at 316.
96. Jurists have debated whether Justice Powell’s discussion of the diversity rationale is
binding precedent because no other Justice joined that part of the opinion. See Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (discussing divergent cases considering this issue); Joelle A.
Marty, Comment, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Federal Circuit Court Split Over Bakke’s
Diversity Rationale, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 505, 508 nn.9–10 (2003) (comparing the approaches of
different circuit courts in interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Bakke).
97. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial
Identity as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1997); Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation,
43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1859 (1996).

A9_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES

7/26/2017 12:01 AM

2205

action in higher education in its companion cases of Gratz v. Bollinger98 and
Grutter v. Bollinger99—both of which Bakke’s guiding principles heavily
influenced.100
In both cases, which challenged the race-conscious undergraduate and
law school admissions policies the University of Michigan employed,101 the
Court recognized the pursuit of “the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body”102 as a compelling interest to justify considering an
applicant’s race in admissions decisions.103 In so doing, the Court invoked
Justice Powell’s reasoning in Bakke by acknowledging universities’ educational
autonomy and granting them deference in their judgment that student-body
diversity is critical to their academic mission.104
Bakke also served as a guide for the Court as it articulated and examined
the contours of a permissible narrowly tailored race-conscious admissions
program. In upholding the plan in Grutter, the Court found that Michigan’s
consideration of race as a permissible “plus factor” afforded each applicant
the sort of individualized consideration Justice Powell had contemplated.105
In contrast, the undergraduate admissions program that Gratz challenged—which
automatically awarded 20 points to all minority applicants—impermissibly allowed race
essentially to serve as the determinative criteria for admissions decisions.106 In so
doing, the Court found that the plan conflicted with the principles that Bakke
set forth and prevented applicants from receiving the individualized
consideration due them under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.107
Following Grutter, university administrators had at their disposal a new
“touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions
policies”108 and a model for the type of race-conscious plan that would pass
constitutional scrutiny.109 Some institutions, such as the University of Texas,
began to reinstitute affirmative-action programs they had previously

98. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
99. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
100. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–75; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322–25, 333–43.
101. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 257 (challenging the University of Michigan’s consideration of
race in undergraduate admissions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 316–17 (challenging the University of
Michigan Law School’s consideration of race in admissions decisions).
102. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
103. Id. at 325 (“endors[ing] Justice Powell’s view that student body diversity is a compelling
state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions”); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 268
(2003) (rejecting petitioners’ argument that diversity in admissions is not a compelling interest).
104. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–29.
105. Id. at 334–41.
106. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270–75.
107. See id.
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (referring to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke).
109. See Michael A. Fletcher, Decision Means Most Colleges Will Stay Course, WASH. POST, June
24, 2003, at A09 (describing Grutter and Gratz as “a road map for crafting affirmative action
programs that pass constitutional muster”).
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abandoned,110 which set the stage for yet another Supreme Court inquiry into
their constitutionality. However, unlike the Court’s decision in Grutter that
unquestionably endorsed the diversity-rationale tenets that Bakke set forth, the
Court’s recent decision in Fisher I challenged and restricted Grutter’s
guidelines for employing race-conscious admissions plans to achieve the
benefits of diversity.111
B. THE DEMAND FOR MORE EXACTING SCRUTINY
In Fisher I, plaintiff Abigail Fisher filed suit against the University of Texas
at Austin (“UT”), the state’s “flagship”112 public university,113 alleging that its
consideration of race in admissions decisions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.114 Both the federal district court and
the Fifth Circuit upheld UT’s policies and practices in conducting race-

110. See Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2–5, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (No.
1:08-CV-00263-SS), 2009 WL 5055457; Press Release, The Univ. of Tex. at Austin, The University
of Texas at Austin Reacts to the Supreme Court’s Affirmative Action Decisions (June 23, 2003),
https://news.utexas.edu/2003/06/23/nr_affirmativeaction. Some institutions, such as Texas
A&M University and the University of Georgia, decided not to reinstitute their affirmative action
policies; see also Nancy G. McDuff & Halley Potter, Ensuring Diversity Under Race-Neutral Admissions
at the University of Georgia, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER
EDUCATION DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 122, 124 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed.,
2014); Marc Levin, Texas A&M Slaps Down Reverse Discrimination, FRONTPAGEMAG.COM (Dec. 11,
2003), http://archive.frontpagemag.com/readArticle.aspx?ARTID=15044.
111. See John C. Brittain, Affirmative Action Survives Again in the Supreme Court on a Legal
Technicality: An Analysis of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 57 HOW. L.J. 963, 973–74 (2014)
(noting that the majority in Fisher I considered parts of its strict scrutiny analysis to be “at odds
with Grutter”); John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, Fisher v. Texas: The Limits of Exhaustion and
the Future of Race-Conscious University Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 904 (2014)
(discussing “the ways in which the Fisher decision departs from precedent, proscribes new limits
on the use of race in university admissions, and tightens requirements for narrow tailoring”);
Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection Clause—Public-University Affirmative Action—Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin, 127 HARV. L. REV. 258, 263 (2013) [hereinafter Fourteenth
Amendment] (“Thus, the means-ends distinction Justice Kennedy articulated in Fisher as
consistent with Grutter was birthed as a critique of the Grutter majority. Whichever Justice has the
better of the constitutional argument, there is a doctrinal shift here . . . .”).
112. States generally use the term “flagship” to refer to their most selective public institutions
of higher education from a student-admissions perspective. The term here acknowledges that
usage, but the authors make no claim beyond that.
113. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2,
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), 2012 WL
3418588, at *2 (“The University of Texas at Austin (the University) is the flagship institution of
Texas’s public university system.”); Brief Amici Curiae of 53 Current Members of the Texas State
Senate & House of Representatives in Support of Respondents at 1, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No.
11-345), 2015 WL 6690038, at *1 (stating the same). Many people also often consider Texas
A&M University to be one of Texas’s flagship institutions. See Brief of the American Educational
Research Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 32–36, Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(No. 11-345), 2012 WL 3527825, at *24 (identifying UT and Texas A&M as Texas’s flagship
institutions); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Black Women Lawyers Ass’n of Greater Chicago, Inc., in
Support of Respondents at 24, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241) & Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 244 (2003) (No. 02-516) (stating the same).
114. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417.
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conscious admissions.115 Both lower courts held that racial diversity was a
compelling state interest and that UT had narrowly tailored its admissions
policies that took account of race to fit the compelling governmental interest
of racial diversity.116
Writing for the Court in Fisher I, Justice Anthony Kennedy began by
affirming the holding in Bakke that achieving the educational benefits that
flow from diverse learning environments is a compelling state interest.117 In
doing so, however, Justice Kennedy refined and constrained the diversity
rationale by clarifying that it is the educational benefits that flow from racial
diversity that are the compelling governmental interest, and not racial
diversity alone.118 The opinion characterizes racial diversity independent of
educational benefits as “racial balancing,” which the Court clearly denounces
as unconstitutional in this context.119
In discussing the compelling interest it identified in Bakke and sanctioned
in Grutter, the Fisher I Court failed to recognize important states’ interests that
public universities further by educating students from diverse backgrounds.120
Unlike Justice O’Connor, who broadly discussed the social, democratic, and
educational benefits of diversity in Grutter,121 Justice Kennedy referred only to
those diversity values realized in academic settings, such as “enhanced
classroom dialogue and the lessening of racial isolation and stereotypes”
among students.122 “[S]tate[s’] interest[s] in debunking racial stereotypes”
within their citizenry and “creating a racially diverse workforce for the labor
market” are also embedded in the diversity rationale and, therefore,
constitute broad compelling goals that go far beyond the narrow scope of
diversity benefits Fisher I recognized.123
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy made a point of noting that justices
“disagree[d] about whether Grutter was consistent with the principles of equal
protection in approving this compelling interest in diversity.”124 By

115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 230–31, 247 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded by Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 587, 604, 612 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded by Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
117. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2417–18.
118. See Carla D. Pratt, The End of Indeterminacy in Affirmative Action, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 535,
551 (2014) (“By constraining the diversity interest to only the interest in using diversity to achieve
educational benefits, the Court has created an unnecessary disjuncture between public and
educational interests in diversity in higher education.”).
119. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (quoting Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003)).
120. See Pratt, supra note 118, at 550–52 (“[T]he state’s interest in making public-funded
higher education equally accessible to all races or achieving racial equality in educational
outcomes arguably would not be . . . a compelling governmental interest . . . .”).
121. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–33 (describing the various benefits that diversity provides to
higher education, specifically law schools).
122. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.
123. Pratt, supra note 118, at 549–51 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
124. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
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acknowledging only the educational benefits resulting from student-body
diversity, the Court constrained its previous articulation of the permissible
constitutional interest at stake and, thereby, made the first prong of the strictscrutiny test more narrow and stringent for public universities seeking to
assert the compelling governmental interest of diversity.125
Fisher I also calls for stricter scrutiny than the Court relied on in Grutter
for courts determining whether a race-conscious plan is narrowly tailored. In
discussing a university’s pursuit of diversity’s educational benefits, Justice
Kennedy agreed with Justice O’Connor that academic freedom provides
colleges and universities with some latitude to determine their educational
missions and goals.126 Therefore, “some, but not complete, judicial deference
is proper”127 when courts decide the constitutionality of educational
institutions’ compelling interests.
However, in an apparent departure from Grutter,128 Fisher I made clear
that courts should afford no such deference when they review universities’
chosen means by which to achieve their educational goals.129 According to the
Court, “the [u]niversity receives no deference”130 and must convince the
reviewing court that its use of “race to achieve the educational benefits of
diversity” is a “necessary” endeavor.131
The Court’s discussion of this newly articulated necessity standard
heightens the scrutiny under which courts will adjudicate race-conscious
admissions plans132 and, thereby, amplifies the importance of universities’
125. See supra notes 100–07 and accompanying text.
126. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); see also Vinay
Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher,
45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 814–16 (2015) (discussing universities’ abilities to define their
educational goals in light of the deference that Fisher I granted to them).
127. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419.
128. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (“We take the Law School at its
word that it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions formula’ and will
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable.”); id. at 364 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“The majority’s broad deference to both the Law School’s judgment that racial
aesthetics leads to educational benefits and its stubborn refusal to alter the status quo in
admissions methods finds no basis in the Constitution or decisions of this Court.”); id. at 388
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Court confuses deference to a university’s definition of its
educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex.
at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011) (concluding that Grutter held that “the narrowtailoring inquiry—like the compelling-interest inquiry—is undertaken with a degree of deference
to the University’s constitutionally protected, presumably expert academic judgment”); Eboni S.
Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational Autonomy and Expert Judgments in
Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133, 1136 n.15 (2013) (detailing jurists’ and scholars’
findings that Grutter afforded deference to the Law School’s judgments regarding both its
educational goals and the means by which to achieve them).
129. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L. REV. 489, 492 (2013)
(noting that affirmative action “programs would face more rigorous review” under Fisher I); Eboni
S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 519,
528–30 (2014) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the narrowly tailoring requirement
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consideration of race-neutral alternatives as Grutter requires.133 In raising the
constitutional bar for using race in higher-education admissions decisions,
Fisher I mandates that, regarding race-neutral alternatives:
Consideration by the university is of course necessary, but it is not
sufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny: The reviewing court must
ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives
would produce the educational benefits of diversity. If “a nonracial
approach . . . could promote the substantial interest about as well
and at tolerable administrative expense,” then the university may not
consider race.134
Consequently, universities seeking to produce racially diverse student bodies
that yield educational benefits and achieve their educational goals must first
consider135 race-neutral means for achieving such benefits and goals prior to
resorting to using race. In light of this, examining the viability of race-neutral
alternatives in higher-education admissions is both an important and
necessary endeavor.
IV.

EXPERIMENTING WITH RACE NEUTRALITY

A. THE TEXAS TEN PERCENT PLAN AS A RACE-CONSCIOUS MODEL OF RACE
NEUTRALITY
Texas has been a battleground state in the debate over race-conscious
affirmative action. In the mid-1990s, a non-profit organization called the

in Fisher I); Powell & Menendian, supra note 111, at 908–15 (discussing the ways in which the
Fisher I Court created more stringent narrowly tailoring requirements for race-conscious
admissions plans); Richard Sander & Aaron Danielson, Thinking Hard About “Race-Neutral”
Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 967, 967 (2014) (suggesting that Fisher I’s subtle differences in
language “seem[] significantly tougher and harder to evade than the language of earlier Court
decisions”); Robert Smith, Affirmative Action Survives Fisher (Sort of), but What About Schuette, 1 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 71–72 (2013) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Fisher I “‘tighten[s] up’
the level of scrutiny in Grutter”); Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 111, at 267 (concluding that Fisher I
recalibrated Grutter’s strict scrutiny analysis of race-conscious admissions plans).
133. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339–40 (finding plans that are “narrowly tailored” should
“require serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve
the diversity the university seeks”).
134. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
135. Although “consider” arguably means “try” race-neutral alternatives that could plausibly
yield racial diversity, there does not appear to exist a consensus regarding the meaning of Grutter’s
mandate to consider race-neutral alternatives. See, e.g., George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus,
“Serious Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 1001
(2008) (finding the Grutter decision held that “universities must rigorously evaluate appropriate
race-neutral policies to determine the extent to which they support the institution’s specific
diversity goals”); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 945, 978–79 (2004) (discussing the consequences of the Grutter decision and the implications
of the Court’s narrow tailoring standard); Powell & Menendian, supra note 111, at 908–09
(discussing the race-neutral alternative standard set forth in Grutter and how the Fisher Court has
seemingly made the standard more “stringent”); Michael E. Rosman, The Quixotic Search for RaceNeutral Alternatives, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 893–94 (2014) (discussing the Grutter Court’s
problems with “percentage plans” and its rejection of other “race-neutral” plans).
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Center for Individual Rights136 began to implement a strategy to challenge the
consideration of race in higher-education admissions. They identified four
law-school applicants to whom the University of Texas School of Law
(“UTSL”) had denied admission and who were willing to serve as plaintiffs in
litigation aimed at challenging its race-conscious affirmative-action policies
and practices. The petitioners named Cheryl Hopwood, a white single
mother, as the lead plaintiff, and she and the other three plaintiffs sued the
UTSL in federal court alleging that its admissions practice of considering the
race of applicants in making admission decisions violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.137 After losing her claim in the trial
court, Hopwood appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In 1996, a five-judge panel
revisited the diversity rationale the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed in Bakke and
held that diversity in education does not serve a compelling state interest.138
However, in holding the UTSL’s race-conscious admissions procedures
unconstitutional, the court gratuitously suggested that a system that preferred
the underprivileged without regard to race would be constitutional even if it
had the effect of disproportionately aiding minorities.139
Using the superfluous language of Hopwood as guidance, the Texas
legislature responded to the Fifth Circuit’s decision by adopting the Top Ten
Percent Plan (“Plan”).140 The Plan was race-conscious in that the legislators
who adopted it were aware that its design would leverage existing de facto
segregation in public schools and yield racial diversity in the students
admitted to the University of Texas and all public universities in the state.141
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood opened the door and the majority
in Fisher I implied the Plan was race-neutral because, by its terms, it did not
distinguish between applicants on the basis of race, and it specifically
precluded public universities in Texas from doing so.142 By leveraging the
136. CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS., https://www.cir-usa.org (last visited Apr. 20, 2017).
137. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938, 946 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
(1996), abrogated by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). The law school operated an
admissions program in which it evaluated each applicant based on his or her “Texas Index
number,” a mathematical composite of UGPA and LSAT score. Id. at 935. Based on this score, it
deemed an applicant either a “presumptive admit,” “presumptive deny,” or “discretionary”
candidate for admission. Id. The ranges of scores established for placing minority applicants in
each of these categories were lower than the ranges of scores fixed for non-minorities, such that
the school could assign a white applicant and a black applicant with the same composite score to
different categories. Id. at 936–37. For example, it could assign a white applicant with a composite
score of X to the presumptive deny category, while it could assign a black applicant with that same
composite score to the presumptive admit category. Id.
138. Id. at 934; see also Carla D. Pratt, In the Wake of Hopwood: An Update on Affirmative Action
in the Education Arena, 42 HOW. L.J. 451, 457–58 (1999).
139. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
140. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2016). See also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of
Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001); Leslie
Yalof Garfield, The Paradox of Race-Conscious Labels, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1523, 1529–31 (2014).
141. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (citing HOUSE RESEARCH ORG., BILL ANALYSIS, HB 588 4–5 (1997), http://www.lrl.state.tx.
us/scanned/hroBillAnalyses/75-0/HB588.PDF).
142. Id. at 2415–16.
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neighborhood segregation of Texas cities and the resulting de facto143
segregation in Texas public schools that the neighborhood segregation
generated, the Plan extended admission to elite Texas public universities to
many students who otherwise would have been unable to compete for
admission because they had received an inferior education in the K–12
segment of the public education pipeline.144
From 1997 to 2004, the Plan operated as the primary means by which
public institutions of higher education in Texas could diversify their student
bodies.145 Universities continued to read applications of prospective students
to determine whether applicants had unique talents or attributes to
contribute to the diversity of the school, such as athletic ability, musical or
artistic talent, or a unique geographical background, but they did not
consider race in their admissions processes during this period.146 However,
the Supreme Court decided Grutter in 2003, which overruled the decision in
Hopwood that had deemed unconstitutional all race-conscious affirmative
action in higher-education institutions located in the Fifth Circuit.147
Consequently, in 2004, the University of Texas began using a hybrid
admissions system that admitted the bulk of students in accordance with the
Plan, but admitted the remainder of students through a holistic review of
individual applicants that considered various identity factors including
race.148 The Fisher I plaintiffs subsequently challenged this two-prong
approach by arguing that the race-conscious prong of the UT’s admissions
143. Unlike de jure segregation, which laws impose, de facto racial segregation occurs in
public schools because of racially segregated housing patterns that emerged during the Jim Crow
era and persist today. Consequently, Texas is not alone in having de facto segregation as a
contemporary vestige of de jure segregation. See Maurice C. Daniels & Cameron Van Patterson,
(Re)considering Race in the Desegregation of Higher Education, 46 GA. L. REV. 521, 544 n.119 (2012)
(“[R]acial segregation in schools is a function of residential segregation, which is inextricably
linked to socioeconomic inequalities that are related to the legacy of Jim Crow laws, policies, and
practices.”); Lino A. Graglia, Solving the Parents Involved Paradox, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 913
n.15 (2008) (explaining the distinction between de jure and de facto race segregation). See also
generally SHERYLL CASHIN, PLACE, NOT RACE: A NEW VISION OF OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA (2014)
(offering a way forward that seeks to address the inferior education caused by racially segregated
housing patterns, and arguing that using place instead of race in diversity programming will
better amend the structural disadvantages endured by many children of color, while enhancing
the possibility that society move past the racial resentment that affirmative action engenders).
144. See Preston Green, Affirmative Action: A Tool for Rebuilding the K–12 Segment of the Pipeline,
in THE END OF THE PIPELINE: A JOURNEY OF RECOGNITION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS ENTERING THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 139, 139–50 (Dorothy H. Evensen & Carla D. Pratt eds., 2012) (pointing out
that the reason we continue to need race-conscious affirmative action is because states have not
fulfilled the promise of Brown and relegate so many children of color to racially segregated,
underfunded, inferior schools for their primary and secondary educations).
145. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 654 n.121 (5th Cir. 2014).
146. Garfield, supra note 140, at 1531.
147. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (abrogating Hopwood by allowing the
limited use of race considerations for admissions decisions). The Court also decided Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251, 255–57 (2003), which struck down an affirmative action policy and
procedure applied to undergraduate admissions because it assigned points to individuals from
certain racial groups rather than conducting an individualized holistic review of each applicant.
148. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 637–38.
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policy was not necessary to achieve student-body diversity because the “raceneutral” Plan achieved the goal of racial diversity without resorting to
considering any applicant’s race.149
A Supreme Court majority in Fisher I viewed the Plan as race neutral
because it operated without the UT considering the race of applicants who
graduated in the top 10% of their high-school classes. In her dissent, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg essentially called the majority’s characterization of the
Plan as race-neutral a legal fiction. She asserted that the Plan was raceconscious because the Texas Legislature had adopted it knowing that it would
operate to admit a racially diverse group of Texas high school graduates to
the UT and other public colleges in Texas.150 In the Gratz case involving
undergraduate admissions at the University of Michigan, Justice Ginsberg
stated in her dissent that “‘percentage plans’ are just as race conscious as the
point scheme [used by Michigan for undergraduate admissions because] they
get their racially diverse results without saying directly what they are doing or
why they are doing it.”151
Justice Ginsburg’s point could come back to haunt proponents of the
Plan because facial neutrality of a law is insufficient to render it constitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause. Pursuant to the constitutional principle
of separation of powers, the judicial branch of government should give
substantial deference to legislative and executive action. Consequently, laws
the legislative branch enacts will receive a low level of judicial scrutiny unless
they draw distinctions based on a suspect classification such as race or sex.
Rational-basis review is the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.152 It is
the standard courts default to when reviewing government action.153 Unless
the challenged action triggers heightened scrutiny by drawing distinctions
based on a suspect classification, or infringing on a fundamental right, the
court will apply the rational basis test to determine constitutionality.154 Under
rational-basis review, courts will uphold a law as long as it is rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose.155 Courts will subject a challenged
facially neutral law156 that has a disparate impact on a racial group to rationalbasis review unless it imposes a discriminatory impact on that group157 and

149. Id. at 644.
150. As Justice Ginsberg acknowledged, “Only an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral
alternatives [referring to the Ten Percent Plan] as race unconscious.” Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
151. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
152. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 694 (4th ed. 2011).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 13 (1988) (“[W]e have long recognized that a
legitimate and rational goal of price or rate regulation is the protection of consumer welfare.”).
156. A facially neutral law is one that says nothing about race or any suspect classification in
the text of the law. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
157. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 222 (1971).
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has a discriminatory purpose.158 Under the rational-basis test, a court could
hold the Plan to be constitutional because it is rationally related to the
legitimate state goal of achieving racial and geographic diversity in Texas
public higher education.
However, a reviewing court could decide that the Plan triggers strict
scrutiny because it arguably has both a discriminatory impact and a
discriminatory purpose. A court could hold that the Plan imposes a
discriminatory impact on white applicants to Texas colleges by displacing
those who have higher SAT and ACT scores than the students of color
graduating from predominately black or Latina/o high schools who the Plan
admits instead by privileging their high school GPA. A court could also hold
that the Texas legislature had a discriminatory purpose when it enacted the
law because the legislature’s clear intent was to achieve both racial and
geographic diversity in Texas public colleges and universities by excluding a
significant portion of white applicants whom the elite public universities may
otherwise admit. To act with a discriminatory purpose, the legislature must do
more than merely know about the discriminatory impact of its law at the time
of enactment. Instead, a court must find that the legislative body enacted the
law “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects
upon an identifiable group.”159 A court could find that the Texas legislature
adopted the law not merely in spite of its adverse effect on white high school
students, but because it would adversely affect them by excluding a significant
portion of them from admission at elite colleges.
Despite this vulnerability to characterization as a “racial classification”
under equal-protection jurisprudence, the Court has consistently accepted
the Plan as a constitutional race-neutral classification that is reviewed
pursuant to the rational-basis test. Hence, although a completely colorblind
legislature did not enact the Plan, and it is arguably race-conscious because
legislators were conscious of its racial implications when it was adopted, it
remains a race-neutral classification for purposes of equal-protection law.
The Plan’s relatively secure status as race-neutral legislation paves the way
for colleges and universities to experiment with race-neutral admissions
policies that are conscious of their impact on racial diversity. The next
Subpart explores how law schools might exploit this constitutional permission
to experiment with race-neutral measures that are conscious of racial impact
in their efforts to assemble a diverse study body and comply with Fisher I.
B. USING RACE-NEUTRAL CRITERIA IN LAW-SCHOOL ADMISSIONS TO ACHIEVE
RACIAL DIVERSITY
For law schools that interpret the mandate to consider race neutral
alternatives as more than a mandate to think about it, the findings of our study
offer one method to test the viability of race neutrality in law school
admissions. To be clear, the findings from this study do not prove that law

158.
159.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976).
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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schools can achieve a critical mass of students from underrepresented groups
using race neutral admission policies. Instead, the findings from this study
equip law schools with data that can be used to test the viability of race neutral
admissions in a particular law school context.
1. Law Schools Have a Unique Opportunity to Experiment with Race
Neutrality
Researchers have conducted several studies to determine whether the
socioeconomic status of a college applicant, determined by household
income of his or her parents, could potentially benefit universities seeking to
achieve both economic and racial diversity if they weigh it as a factor in their
admissions processes. Proponents of this form of wealth-based affirmative
action view it as fairer than race-conscious affirmative action because it does
not draw distinctions between people based on the practice of classifying
them by race, and it would help the people whom they perceive as needing
and deserving the benefit of affirmative action get into elite colleges.
Proponents of class-based affirmative action argue that race-conscious
affirmative action benefits primarily affluent privileged blacks and other
privileged racial minorities while helping only a few poor racial minorities.160
They frequently reference Barack and Michelle Obama’s daughters as the
exemplar of affluent blacks who do not need or deserve any form of raceconscious affirmative action to get into college.161
This critique of race-conscious affirmative action argues that it is unfair
to have a policy aimed at benefitting affluent and already privileged
individuals from certain racial minority groups over the underprivileged
members of all races.162 Indeed, when educational institutions first
implemented race-conscious affirmative action in the 1960s, the primary
beneficiaries were African–Americans who were the first in their families to
attend college163 and whose parents had endured segregation laws and other
forms of purposeful discrimination trampling asunder their own educational
and employment goals. The current generation of college applicants contains
the children and grandchildren of the first-generation beneficiaries of
affirmative action, affording many of them two college-educated parents and
160. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class,
68 U. COLO. L. REV. 939 (1997); see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
161. This argument ignores the reality that children from politically powerful and wealthy
families have other forms of affirmative action to help them get into the colleges of their choice,
such as receiving a legacy preference due to their parents having attended the school or a donor
preference due to their parents’ financial contributions to the school. When ABC’s George
Stephanopoulos asked President Obama whether his “daughters deserved affirmative action in
college admissions, Obama replied that” they didn’t and asserted that “his daughters should ‘be
treated by any admissions officer as folks who are pretty advantaged.’” Richard Kahlenberg, The
Affirmative Action Trap, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 1, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/affirmativeaction-trap-0.
162. See Malamud, supra note 160, at 988–96 (discussing the continued need for affirmation
action to help those within the black middle class).
163. RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS
STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 28 (2012).
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elite academic preparation at the primary and secondary level.164 Moreover,
with the legalization of interracial marriage in 1967,165 many applicants who
check the “black box” and receive consideration as people who would
increase racial diversity are biracial Americans who have, to some extent,
enjoyed the benefits of white privilege.166 Conversely, some proponents of
affirmative action criticize the way educational institutions implement raceconscious affirmative action because they believe it has become dislodged
from its historical moorings of seeking to redress past racial injustice against
African–Americans. They point to the fact that a significant percentage of
applicants benefitting from race-conscious affirmative action at elite public
universities are foreign-born blacks who did not suffer the intergenerational
harms of slavery and Jim Crow, and arguably displace African–Americans
from educational opportunities.167 Thus, opponents and proponents of raceconscious affirmative action advocate for its abandonment or retooling so that
it benefits more economically disadvantaged students. Underperforming
public primary and secondary schools are more likely to educate students
from low-income households, which leaves these students underprepared to
perform well on college entrance exams.168 As a result, standardized test
scores on the SAT and ACT correlate, with statistical significance, to the
socioeconomic status of high-school student applicants to college.169
Consequently, students from low-income families are more likely to score
lower than what is necessary to compete for and secure a place in the entering
class at many elite public colleges. At Michigan, for example, only 13% of the
undergraduate population received Pell Grants170 from the federal
government. Because the government awards these grants only to
undergraduate students from low-income families171 they serve as a good
164. Id.
165. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
166. See Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1245–54; see also infra note 187. For an understanding
of white privilege, see Peggy McIntosh’s groundbreaking essay identifying the various ways that
her whiteness operates to privilege her in daily life such as being able to walk into any hair salon
and find a hair stylist who can deal with her hair and being able to shop alone without store
personnel following or harassing her. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal
Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in POWER, PRIVILEGE AND
LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 25–27 (Leslie Bender & Daan Braveman eds., 1995). For more
on white privilege, see PAULA S. ROTHENBERG, WHITE PRIVILEGE: ESSENTIAL READINGS ON THE
OTHER SIDE OF RACISM 95–119 (2005).
167. See, e.g., Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1249–54; Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 45, at
1145–56.
168. See Green, supra note 144, at 139–40.
169. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY: DEMOCRATIZING HIGHER EDUCATION
IN AMERICA 52 (2015); LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 68 (2002).
170. ELLEN BERREY, THE ENIGMA OF DIVERSITY: THE LANGUAGE OF RACE AND THE LIMITS OF
RACIAL JUSTICE 96 (2015).
171. Most students receiving a Pell Grant are from families earning less than $80,000 per year. See
generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM ANNUAL DATA REPORTS (2014–2015),
https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2014-15/pell-eoy-2014-15.html (listing the
number of recipients each year by income bracket).
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indicator of the economic diversity in the student body of an undergraduate
institution. Because economically disadvantaged students have a clear need
not only in the financial arena but also in finding opportunities to attend elite
colleges, opponents of race-conscious affirmative action have a persuasive
argument for restructuring affirmative action to benefit this group.
Opponents of class-based affirmative action see this type of reform as a
means of excluding more racial minorities from elite higher education.
Because there are so many more poor whites than poor minorities in the
United States, and because the size of a class-based preference in admissions
at elite schools would have to be very large to yield admission of low income
minority students, prior studies on the use of class-based affirmative action
suggest that this approach may result in fewer racial minorities attending elite
colleges and lower academic credentials of admitted students.172 Despite these
concerns, considering students’ socioeconomic status in admissions decisions
has contributed to racial diversity on college campuses, albeit not to the same
extent as race-conscious measures.173 Because a disproportionate number of
students of color come from low-income households, this race-neutral
approach to affirmative action is still race-conscious, and law schools can use
it to create racially diverse student bodies.
Like other scholars who have examined the Equal Protection Clause in
the educational context, we see it as having the anti-subordination purpose of
eliminating racial caste.174 An affirmative-action policy that perpetuates the
existing stratification of racial minorities in law school by relegating the
overwhelming majority of them to less prestigious institutions would serve to
entrench white racial dominance in the legal profession further. Ignoring
race in law-school admissions altogether would likely have this effect and fail
to preserve the anti-subordination principle embedded in the Equal
Protection Clause. We assert that affirmative action in the law-school context
can be both race-blind and race-conscious, much like the Texas Ten Percent
Plan. Some law schools may be able to abandon the use of race in their
admissions and continue to yield a critical mass of racial diversity by using
socioeconomic questions that align closely with the racial diversity they seek

172. See generally Ben Backes, Do Affirmative Action Bans Lower Minority College Enrollment and
Attainment?: Evidence from Statewide Bans, 47 J. HUM. RESOURCES 435 (2012) (finding that after
statewide bans on considering race in college admissions, black and Hispanic enrollment
dropped at the top institutions in those states); Mark C. Long, Is There a “Workable” Race-Neutral
Alternative to Affirmative Action in College Admissions?, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 162 (2015)
(asserting that in the college admissions context, “a system that uses an applicant’s predicted
likelihood of being an underrepresented racial minority as a proxy for the applicant’s actual
minority status can yield an admitted class [with] a lower predicted [GPA]” than the class would
have had if race had been considered in the admissions process).
173. See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the
War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 41 (2005) (“[C]ollege and university consideration of applicants’
socioeconomic background has helped to increase their diversity levels.”).
174. Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and Legislative Opportunities,
7 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 213, 213–14 (2011) (noting that the Court in Parents Involved
embraced an anti-subordination definition of the equal protection clause and found that the
elimination of racial isolation in public schools was a compelling governmental interest).
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to achieve. In so doing, they may be able to disprove the class-versus-race
dichotomy in affirmative action by asking applicants socioeconomic related
questions about their identity in lieu of asking their race and then weighting
the application of students who fit an established socioeconomic profile.
For example, our study found that African–American students were the
most likely to provide uncompensated service to racial groups that are
underserved by the legal profession. Because law schools should want to do
their part in closing the access-to-justice gap, they could appropriately weight
the applications of applicants who provide documentation of uncompensated
service to racial groups that the legal profession underserves. Our study
suggests that redefining merit in this way would benefit African–American
applicants to law school and possibly help law schools matriculate more
African–American students than asking applicants about their race. Asking
applicants to report this type of service would also send a message that the
schools value it and incentivize others to perform service to these groups.
Law school is a uniquely fertile testing ground for this type of
experimentation because, unlike an undergraduate school where applicants
could game the system by answering questions on an admissions application
in a way that they think will curry favor, law-school applicants must be truthful
on their applications. This is partly because they are applying to become part
of a profession that highly values ethics,175 but also because the Bar authorities
subsequently verify the answers on their application when they apply to take
the Bar examination. We set out to explore what set of race-neutral
socioeconomic questions law schools could ask on the application, in lieu of
race, that might yield significant racial diversity in their student bodies.176 We
also sought to explore, briefly, whether racial diversity in law school
classrooms brought different viewpoints to law school classrooms.

175. The Bar expects high moral character of all persons seeking admission. For a discussion
of moral character as a professional credential, see Carla D. Pratt, Should Klansmen Be Lawyers?:
Racism as an Ethical Barrier to the Legal Profession, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 857, 864–67 (2003); and
Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 507–08 (1985).
176. We recognize that there will be differing views among faculty members in law schools
regarding the proper approach to take to enrolling a diverse class. Some law school deans and
faculty members want to move away from considering race in admissions in an effort to insulate
their schools from legal challenges; others want to use race-blind admission because they object
to racial consideration as improper. Other law school deans and faculty members will want to
continue to use race to achieve a racially diverse class. We anticipate that law schools might
experience some interest convergence among faculty members with differing views. Faculty
members on both sides of the affirmative-action equation may decide to use our study to test the
viability of race-blind admissions, but for different reasons. Faculty members who are opposed to
the use of race might opt for trying a race-blind admission cycle hoping to move the institution
away from racial consideration, whereas those who favor using race in admissions might opt for
trying a race-blind admission cycle in order to obtain evidence that shows that it is not as effective
in achieving a racially diverse student body as the consideration of race, or in order to
demonstrate compliance with Fisher I.
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2. Study Design
This study sought to determine race-neutral identity factors that align
closely with the socially mapped racial groups that enter law schools each year.
We sought to design a study that would inform the law-school admissions
process and help law schools test whether they could seat a racially diverse
student body without asking applicants about their race. The ability to seat a
racially diverse student body without asking about race is important for three
reasons. First, having a race-blind tool to help identify students who will
contribute to student-body diversity is essential for law schools operating in
jurisdictions that ban racial consideration in higher education admissions
decisions.177 Second, having a race-blind tool is helpful to law schools in
jurisdictions that do allow racial consideration in law school admissions
because identifying race-neutral identity factors that law schools can ask about
on their applications provides them with a means178 to “consider” race-blind
admissions as Fisher I requires.179 Our study will provide useful information to
law schools that may be interested in experimenting with a race-blind
admission cycle in an effort to determine whether the school could yield a
critical mass of racial minority students if it moved to a race-neutral admissions
process. Finally, with the continued constitutional attacks on race-conscious
admissions practices, a race-neutral admissions tool may become a necessity
for all law schools seeking to seat a diverse student body if the Supreme Court
restricts the use of race in higher-education admissions in the future.180We
were the investigators in the study. We are wholly responsible for the study’s
design and implementation. We collectively designed the survey instrument
that study participants completed181 by first conducting a literature review to
determine the social and economic aspects of life that disproportionately
impact people of color. We used that literature to develop survey questions
related to personal identity.182 For example, the literature on education shows
177. Presently, eight states ban race-conscious affirmative action in higher-education
admission: Florida, New Hampshire, California, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, Arizona, and
Oklahoma. See Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx.
178. We do not assert that our study is the only means by which a law school could
experiment with the viability of race-neutral admissions. We assert that it is merely one way that
law schools can fulfill the mandate of Fisher I, which is to consider race-neutral alternatives to
asking applicants to identify their race in the admissions application process.
179. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
180. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
181. See Appendix A.
182. REBECCA GOLDRING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM
THE 2011–12 SCHOOLS AND STAFFING SURVEY (2013) https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013314.pdf
(Survey Question B-1). We have known since at least 1978 that the racial composition of high schools
impacts college attendance and test performance. See ROBERT L. CRAIN & RITA E. MAHARD, RAND
CORP., THE INFLUENCE OF HIGH SCHOOL RACIAL COMPOSITION ON BLACK COLLEGE ATTENDANCE AND
TEST PERFORMANCE (1978), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs78/78212.pdf (Survey Question B-2; a national
longitudinal study); see also Discrimination in Education, 85th Session of the Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Geneva (Aug. 2014) (documenting the continued
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racial subordination of children of color who are victims of de facto racial segregation in public
education); KATHERINE RALSTON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE NATIONAL SCHOOL LUNCH
PROGRAM: BACKGROUND, TRENDS, AND ISSUES (2008) (Survey Question B-3).
Eligibility for the free and reduced-price lunch program is often used as a proxy
measure of family income . . . . Overall, 41 percent of 4th-graders were eligible for
free or reduced-price lunches in 2005. White 4th-graders had the lowest percentage
of eligible students (24 percent). The percentages of Black and Hispanic 4th-graders
(70 and 73 percent) who were eligible were three times the percentages of White
4th-graders who were eligible, and the percentage of American Indian/Alaska
Native 4th-graders (65 percent) who were eligible was nearly three times that of
Whites. Asians/Pacific Islanders also had a higher percentage (33 percent) of
eligible students than did Whites, but a lower percentage than did Blacks, Hispanics,
or American Indians/Alaska Natives.
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, Status and Trends in the Education of Racial and Ethnic Minorities:
Indicator 7: Elementary and Secondary Enrollment (Sept. 2007) (citation omitted), https://nces.ed.gov/
pubs2007/minoritytrends/ind_2_7.asp; Teresa L. Morisi, Youth Enrollment and Employment During the
School Year, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 51, 58 (2008) (Survey Question B-4); see also generally CHILD TRENDS
DATABANK, YOUTH EMPLOYMENT: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH, http://www.childtrends.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/05/120_Youth_Employment.pdf (last updated Dec. 2015). As recent as
the 2013–14 school year, only 73 percent of black public high school students and 76 percent of
Hispanic public high school students graduated on time with a regular diploma. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STATISTICS, The Condition of Education: Public High School Graduation Rates (last updated May 2016),
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_coi.asp (Survey Question B-5). This achievement gap
has existed for decades, which suggests that minority law school applicants and law students who are
from black and/or Hispanic households are more likely to have parents who did not complete high
school. Id.; XIAOJIE LI, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, CHARACTERISTICS OF MINORITY-SERVING
INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY UNDERGRADUATES ENROLLED IN THESE INSTITUTIONS: POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS REPORT 38 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2008/2008156.pdf
(Survey Question B-6). Oliver and Shapiro document the wealth gap between black and white families
and the primary causes for that gap. They point out that black families earn lower incomes and suffer
higher unemployment rates, which suggests that black law-school applicants and black law students
may have had to work for money in college more than non-black college students. MELVIN L. OLIVER
& THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY
(1995) (Survey Question B-7) [hereinafter BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH]. Evensen and Pratt found
that black law students reported having to work for money to get through college and law school. See
generally Green, supra note 144 (Survey Question B-8); see also generally MARK KANTROWITZ, STUDENT
AID POLICY ANALYSIS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIPS BY RACE (2011). Susan P. Choy,
Students Whose Parents Did Not Go to College: Postsecondary Access, Persistence, and Attainment, in THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 6 (2001) (Survey Question B-9); see generally Green, supra note 144 (Survey
Question B-10; suggesting that many black law students are the first in their immediate family to attend
law school, and many black law-student participants in the study reported not even knowing a black
lawyer before going to law school). See Carla D. Pratt, Way to Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in
Contemporary American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1409, 1431 (2009) (Survey Question B-11;
noting that black culture socializes people to have a sense of responsibility to give back to their black
communities, which is why many black lawyers devote their philanthropic efforts toward the less
fortunate living in black communities). KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., CHILDREN IN SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES
BY RACE, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/107-children-in-single-parent-families-byrace?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/869,36,868,867,133/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/432,431 (last
updated Jan. 2017) (Survey Question C-1). ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2009: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES ( 2011) (Survey Question
C-2). Teresa Wiltz, Racial and Ethnic Disparities Persist in Teen Pregnancy Rates, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS:
STATELINE (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2015/3/03/racial-and-ethnic-disparities-persist-in-teen-pregnancy-rates (Survey Question C-3).
SHELLEY K. IRVING & TRACY A. LOVELESS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:
PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, 2009–2012: WHO GETS ASSISTANCE?: HOUSEHOLD
ECONOMIC STUDIES (2015) (Survey Question C-4). Oliver and Shapiro, in their study of white family

A9_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2220

7/26/2017 12:01 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:2187

that a large portion of children of color are educated in the public-school
system.183 Consequently, we formulated identity-related questions about the
wealth and black family wealth, have consistently documented that annual household income for black
families is on average less than annual household income for white families. Consequently, we
anticipated that family income for black, Native American and Hispanic law-school applicants might
be considerably less than family income for whites. See BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH, supra (Survey
Question C-5). We asked about family income while study participants were in high school because
family income at that time likely would influence the trajectory of the students’ education, including
where they went to college. Because mass incarceration has had a disparate impact on people of color,
we asked about incarceration. We limited the question to immediate family out of fear that the broad
sweep of mass incarceration may have touched every American family at some level. See generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS
(2010) (Survey Questions C-6 and C-7). We asked if students were raised in households that spoke a
language other than English, rather than ask about language fluency, because we anticipated that
asking about language fluency would capture students who learned another language without a
cultural connection to that language and would miss students who had a cultural connection to a
language other than English, but whose parents did not teach it to them in an effort to protect them
from racial and ethnic discrimination by whites. Available statistics show that “[t]he percentage of
public school students in the United States who were English language learners was higher in school
year 2013–43 (9.3 percent, or an estimated 4.5 million students) than in 2003–04 (8.8 percent, or an
estimated 4.2 million students) and in 2012–13 (9.2 percent, or an estimated 4.4 million students).”
Fast Facts: English Language Learners, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/
display.asp?id=96 (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (Survey Question C-8). Religious Landscape Study: Racial
and Ethnic Composition, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/racialand-ethnic-composition (last visited Apr. 20, 2017) (Survey Question C-9). We were cognizant of the
fact that the places where students come from often help determine their opportunities, so we asked
students to disclose this information. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE
AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 3–4 (2004). See generally CASHIN, supra note 145
(Survey Question C-10; arguing that affirmative action should move away from race and toward “place”
to locate its intended beneficiaries). KIDS COUNT DATA CTR., Children Living in Areas of Concentrated
Poverty by Race and Ethnicity, http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/tables/7753-children-living-inareas-of-concentrated-poverty-by-race-and-ethnicity?loc=1&loct=1#detailed/1/any/false/1485,1376,1
201,1074,880/10,11,9,12,1,185,13/14943,14942 (last updated Jan. 2017) (Survey Question C-11).
Questions were added to assess the views of student participants regarding the importance of diversity
in the classroom. While the Supreme Court and various educators have asserted the importance of
diversity, we wanted to take this opportunity to get the opinion of the people who were experience
education in law school classrooms. Since the goal of the study is to provide law schools with tools for
achieving diversity in law school classrooms, we thought the survey was a good opportunity to assess the
students’ views about the importance of diversity in the law school classroom. Some of the questions
eliminate “race” from the diversity calculus in an effort to identify whether law students value raceneutral forms of diversity over racial diversity. We know from existing literature that the general
population has different views about race-based affirmative action with blacks favoring it at a much
higher rate than whites, but we were not sure whether this racial dichotomy of viewpoint would hold
up in the “diversity in law school” context. Conflicted Views of Affirmative Action: Summary of Findings, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 14, 2003), http://www.people-press.org/2003/05/14/conflicted-views-of-affirmativeaction (Survey Questions D-1 through D-4).
183. “Black students are six times more likely to attend high-poverty” low-performing public
schools with 45% of black students attending these schools compared to only 7% of white students.
Tanvi Misra, The Stark Inequality of U.S. Public Schools, Mapped, CITYLAB (May 14, 2015),
http://www.citylab.com/housing/2015/05/the-stark-inequality-of-us-public-schools-mapped/393
095. U.S. Department of Education data show that non-white school aged children attending private
schools is around 30% of the overall private school population and 69.6% of school aged children
in private schools are white. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov (last visited
Apr. 20, 2017). Moreover, the National Center for Education Statistics reports:
From fall 2003 through fall 2013, the number of White students enrolled in public
elementary and secondary schools decreased from 28.4 million to 25.2 million, and

A9_NELSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES

7/26/2017 12:01 AM

2221

nature of the K–12 education that student participants received. The
literature we relied upon to develop the survey questions focused on studies
involving the general population. As a result, we were not sure whether the
findings of this literature were transferrable to a relatively privileged subset of
the general population, such as law students.184 Administering the survey to
first-year law students will inform our understanding of whether there are
social identity factors that align more closely with law students of certain racial
groups.
Our construction of the survey instrument was also informed by the
theory of intersectionality.185 The theory of intersectionality originates from
critical-race theory and posits that some individuals reside at the intersection
of more than one subordinated identity.186 A black woman, for example, exists
at the intersection of her subordinated racial identity and her subordinated
gender identity. Her experience as a person whose identity exists at the
intersection of two subordinated identity factors is therefore different from a
white woman’s experience who endures subordination of her gender identity
but enjoys the benefits of racial privilege. Just as an individual may have an
identity that exists at the intersection of more than one subordinated identity,
there may be certain social identity factors that intersect with one another
more often than others. In other words, the theory of intersectionality alerted
us to the possibility that a cluster of identity factors that align with a particular
race more closely than other races may exist. Through analysis of the survey
data, we seek to identify which identity factors individually align closely with
each racial group. We also seek to understand and identify whether there are
the percentage of students who were White decreased from 59 to 50 percent. In
contrast, the number of Hispanic students enrolled during this period increased
from 9.0 million to 12.5 million, and the percentage who were Hispanic increased
from 19 to 25 percent. The number of Black students enrolled decreased from 8.3
million to 7.8 million, and the percentage who were Black decreased from 17 to 16
percent. Since fall 2002, the percentage of students enrolled in public schools who
were Hispanic has exceeded the percentage who were Black. Additionally, the
number of American Indian/Alaska Native students enrolled from fall 2003 to fall
2013 decreased from 0.6 million to 0.5 million, and the percentage who were
American Indian/Alaska Native remained around 1 percent. The number of White
students enrolled in public schools is projected to continue decreasing between fall
2014 and fall 2025 (from 25.0 million to 23.5 million) and to account for 46 percent
of total enrollment in 2025.
Racial/Ethnic Enrollment in Public Schools, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/
programs/coe/indicator_cge.asp (last updated May 2016).
184. Law students are a privileged group in that they generally have achieved at least a
bachelor’s degree and have demonstrated academic and non-academic achievements that earn
them admission to law school. In the 2014–15 academic year, there were 54,467 applicants to ABA
approved U.S. law schools and only 35,726 of those applicants matriculated to law school. LAW
SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, US NATIONAL DECISION PROFILES–FALL TERM 2014–2015
APPLICATION YEAR SUMMARY (2016), http://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/data-(members)/
national-decision-profiles-fall-2015.pdf.
185. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, in CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM: A READER 23 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003).
186. Id.
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individual identity factors that intersect in a meaningful way to bring the
relationship with a particular racial group even closer to that particular
identity factor. If certain identity factors intersect in a way to heighten their
relationship to a particular racial group, law schools could potentially use that
subset of identity related questions on their applications to conduct race-blind
admissions that yield a critical mass of students from racial groups that are
underrepresented in law schools and the legal profession.
In addition to questions related to identity, the survey also contains four
questions related to viewpoint. Law schools seeking to conduct race-blind
admissions could not use these opinion-based questions in their applications
because applicants would likely proffer answers that they think the law school
would value since opinions are not facts that can be verified by bar authorities.
Consequently, we added these questions to the survey to help law schools
understand the perceived value of diversity in their individual institutions and
whether minority students bring viewpoints to their classrooms that differ
significantly from viewpoints of white students. We framed the four questions
in the context of diversity in an effort to determine whether students value a
diverse learning environment and whether there are differences in student
views that align with race.
Overall, this study is exploratory in nature; thus, we do not posit any
specific research hypotheses. We do, however, examine this research
question: Is there a relationship between law-school students’ racial/ethnic background
and their reported identification with race-neutral identity factors?
3. Data Collection
We restricted data collection to first-year law students enrolled at public
ABA approved law schools in jurisdictions that presently permit raceconscious affirmative action in higher education. We restricted the study to
first-year students who have matriculated to law school because they provide
the most recent example of students willing to attend law school in general
and the law school that enrolled them in particular. We considered, but
rejected, a study design surveying applicants to law schools because applicants
would be harder to reach and many applicants overlap with multiple law
schools, so using matriculants instead of applicants avoids the problem of
inviting the same applicant to complete the survey more than once. Because
we administered the survey to anonymous participants, if we surveyed
applicants instead of matriculants we would have had no reliable means of
protecting against duplication in the completion of the survey.
We restricted participation to public law schools in jurisdictions that
permit racial consideration in admissions because we anticipated that law
schools in those jurisdictions would be more likely to have more diversity in
their student body and specifically more students of color. Public law schools
in jurisdictions that permit racial consideration in law school admissions are
also more vulnerable to suit by a challenger if they employ race-conscious
affirmative action. Consequently, we thought this group of law schools could
benefit from their students’ participation in the study.
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We sought to administer the survey to law students at a cross-section of
public ABA approved U.S. law schools. We identified this cross-section by
considering the geographical region of the United States where the law school
is located, the campus setting in which it is situated (such as urban, suburban
or rural), its size, and its U.S. News & World Report ranking. We used these lawschool identity factors to ensure that the study would capture a diverse group
of law schools because we recognized that student social and economic
identity factors may present and operate differently at a top-ranked urban law
school than at a lower-ranked law school in a rural setting.
To secure participating schools, our research team sent an invitation
letter to the dean at each public ABA approved law school inviting them to
have their law school participate in the study. After securing the commitment
of several deans, we followed up with individual deans at law schools that
would help us meet the cross-section requirements identified above. We
sought to have between 10 and 12 law schools in our sample so that, with an
average of 100 student participants per law school, we would have a dataset
with approximately 1,000 survey participants if we had a high participation
rate among students. To avoid conflict of interest issues, we rejected the idea
of a financial incentive to induce a high participation rate of students at each
law school and instead asked deans to permit us to administer the survey
during a time when the first-year class convened for some other purpose, such
as orientation, a speaker, or a course. This proved to be a successful method
for achieving a high participation rate (88%) among first year students at
participating law schools.
This study’s design is not without limitations. Using a survey instrument
creates an interpretation challenge because, despite careful wording of
questions, not all participants will interpret the survey questions the same way.
Moreover, our survey captures some identity characteristics, but not all, so
there will undoubtedly be areas of social identity that we do not cover—but
that may nonetheless align closely with race. Our survey, like all surveys, is
subject to the reality that some participants may choose to answer falsely.
Because we are surveying current law students in the process of indoctrination
into a profession that emphasizes ethics, we think the risk of participant
sabotage is probably less than in surveys administered to the general
population. Likewise, the survey is subject to biases in that some participants
may recall certain information about themselves or their families in a way that
is filtered through their own cognitive biases. It is impossible to eliminate
these drawbacks from survey-based research, and they are not significant
enough to invalidate it.
4. Data Analysis
We used descriptive statistics (e.g., frequencies and percentages) to
highlight demographic information, such as the number of students at each
law school. We also used descriptive statistics to illustrate how many students
in each racial or ethnic group endorsed race-neutral items on the survey. This
information is important because it provides a visual overview of which raceneutral factors participants endorsed more and which they endorsed less.
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These analyses also allow for a cursory comparison between the racial or
ethnic groups on which race-neutral factors they endorsed.
We used inferential statistics to examine the more complex question in
this study (i.e., “Is there a relationship between law school students’
racial/ethnic background and their willingness to endorse race-neutral
identity factors?”). Examining each race-neutral item on the survey in
isolation can be informative. However, it is often the case that a single item
on a survey does not provide sufficient information about race neutrality, nor
does it allow for inferences about what it means if, for example,
African–American students endorse a race-neutral item at a much higher rate
than white students. However, when several race-neutral items on a survey can
be added together to make a single item, then this provides a more complex
story about race-neutral factors. More importantly, by combining items, it is
possible to conduct more complex analyses and draw more meaningful
inferences from them. To examine whether any of the items on our survey
were conceptually related with one another, we conducted factor analyses on
two key survey sections: student background and family background. We then
created composite variables by combining all conceptually related items.
These composite variables are important because they have a scoring range
from low to high so that the higher participant scores on them, the more he
or she endorses them.
By creating composite variables of the race-neutral survey items, we were
able to report, on average, what each racial or ethnic group scored for each
variable. Higher scores denote greater endorsement of that variable, and
composite scores also allow for drawing statistically meaningful inferences
about differences between groups. For this study, we used analyses of variance
(“ANOVA”) to examine whether there were statistically significant differences
between racial or ethnic groups on the composite variables that we created
for the student-background and family-background sections of the survey.
This analysis allowed us truly to address our research question in a statistically
meaningful way.
It is important to mention that six racial or ethnic groups (i.e., white,
African–American, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic, biracial/multiracial, and
other) were included in all descriptive analyses because we simply reported
the trends in their responses. Participants who identified as biracial or
multiracial were those who checked more than one racial or ethnic category
(e.g., checking both African–American and Cuban). Participants who
identified as other had a greater range of ethnicities, including Italian,
German, Arab–American, to name a few. We excluded all participants who
identified as biracial or multiracial for all inferential statistics because of
methodological concerns. Biracial or multiracial participants checked more
than one racial category, which made it difficult to assign them to a
category.187 Moreover, participants who selected “other” were excluded
because they were too heterogeneous to be placed in one category.
187. Considering the current and projected racial demographics of American society and
the increasing number of biracial and multiracial students attending institutions of higher
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FINDINGS

We sampled 10 law schools for this study. Five schools were located in the
northeast region of the United States, three in the southern region, and two
in the southwestern region. Table 1 provides the racial and gender
demographics for each school.
Table 1. Racial and Gender Demographics for First-Year Law Students by
Law School
Law
Schools

Female
n (%)

White
n (%)

LS1

71
(38.4%)
29
(44.6%)
45
(47.9%)
68
(53.1%)
32
(53.3%)
65
(45.8%)
34
(48.6%)
73
(65.2%)
44
(48.9%)
43
(48.3%)

141
(76.2%)
48
(73.8%)
82
(87.2%)
100
(78.1%)
38
(63.3%)
101
(71.1%)
60
(85.7%)
3
(2.7%)
50
(55.6%)
78
(87.6%)

LS2
LS3
LS4
LS5
LS6
LS7
LS8
LS9
LS10

AfricanAmerican
n (%)
24
(13.0%)
2
(3.1%)
5
(5.3%)
6
(4.7%)
9
(15.0%)
5
(3.5%)
4
(5.7%)
91
(81.3%)
6
(6.7%)
3
(3.4%)

Asian/Pacific
Islander
n (%)
5
(2.7%)
8
(12.3%)
2
(2.1%)
3
(2.3%)
3
(5.0%)
13
(9.2%)
1
(1.4%)
1
(0.9%)
6
(6.7%)
0
(0%)

Hispanic
n (%)
2
(1.2%)
2
(2.1%)
2
(2.1%)
12
(9.4%)
5
(8.3%)
6
(4.2%)
1
(1.4%)
0
(0%)
8
(8.9%)
1
(1.1%)

Note: “LS” denotes law school.
The majority of the law schools had slightly more male than female firstyear students. Moreover, with the exception of LS 8 and LS 9, over 70% of
the first-year student body identified as white. LS 8 had more
African–American students (81.3%) than other schools, LS 4 had more
Hispanic students (9.4%), and LS 2 had more Asian/Pacific Islander students
education, an important future area of study will be to examine the extent to which biracial and
multiracial students endorse race-neutral identity factors and whether their endorsements differ
from those made by whites and other minority students. See Brown & Bell, supra note 45, at 1234
n.9 (noting the number of American citizens who self-identified as multiracial in the 2000 Census
and the racial categories with which they identified). As Professors Brown, Bell and OnwuachiWillig have demonstrated, examining students’ racial and ethnic backgrounds, particularly those
admitted to institutions employing affirmative action, has important implications for student
diversity in higher education. See id. at 1242–54; see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 45, at 1143
(discussing the importance of considering “the actual ethnic backgrounds or ancestral heritages
of . . . students”).
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(12.3%). Overall, there were 1,035 participants in this study (white [n = 701,
72.4%], African–American [n = 155, 16.0%], Asian/Pacific Islander [n = 42,
4.3%], Hispanic [n = 39, 4.0%], Biracial/Multiracial [n = 67, 6.5%], and
other [n = 31, 3.2%]).
Our goal for this study was not to compare the ten law schools, but rather
to aggregate the data from each school to conduct a more comprehensive
examination of the use of race-neutral factors in law schools generally. We
report all subsequent analyses and findings on this aggregated data. As
mentioned earlier, we divided the survey into questions about student
educational backgrounds and family background. It was important to first
examine trends in data regarding which race-neutral factors each racial or
ethnic group endorsed. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for each
race-neutral student-educational-background survey item, broken down by
racial or ethnic group. Although racial or ethnic groups are similar on some
race-neutral items, they differ on others. Overall, African–American and
Hispanic students endorsed more race-neutral student educational
background items (e.g., going to high schools that had a majority of racial or
ethnic minorities, receiving free or reduced lunches in high school, receiving
Pell Grants as undergraduates) than did other racial or ethnic groups.
African–American students were the most likely to report high levels of
uncompensated service to racial groups that the legal profession underserves.
White and Asian/Pacific Islander students were least likely to endorse raceneutral student educational background items.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items Focused on Race-Neutral
Student Educational Background

Public H.S.
Racial
Minorities
Majority of
H.S.
Free/
Reduced
Lunch
Worked
While in
H.S.
First to
Graduate
H.S.
Attended
HBCU, HSI,
or Tribal
College
Worked for
Pay for 4 or
5 Years of
Undergrad
Received
Pell Grant
First to
Graduate
From
College
First to
Attend Law
School
Contributed
20+ hrs/sem
of Service to
Underserved
Population

White

Afr/Am

Hispanic

87.5%
(n=133)

Asian/
PI
81.0%
(n=34)

76.9%
(n=30)

Bi/MultiRacial
70.1%
(n=47)

76.2
(n=532)
10.3%
(n=68)

37.3%
(n=53)

14.9%
(n=99)

Other
83.9%
(n=5)

16.7%
(n=6)

50.0%
(n=17)

28.6%
(n=16)

22.2%
(n=6)

45.9%
(n=68)

9.5%
(n=4)

48.5%
(n=16)

27.1%
(n=16)

20.7%
(n=6)

39.9%
(n=279)

41.9%
(n=65)

19.0%
(n=8)

48.7%
(n=19)

49.2%
(n=32)

56.7%
(n=17)

2.3%
(n=16)

5.8%
(n=9)

7.3%
(n=3)

7.7%
(n=3)

6.3%
(n=4)

3.2%
(n=1)

0.3%
(n=2)

32.3%
(n=50)

2.4%
(n=1)

5.1%
(n=2)

9.1%
(n=6)

0%
(n=0)

34.3%
(n=240)

37.4%
(n=58)

28.6%
(n=12)

41.0%
(n=16)

41.7%
(n=28)

42.0%
(n=13)

28.0%
(n=193)

62.9%
(n=95)

21.4%
(n=9)

59.0%
(n=23)

37.3%
(n=25)

40.0%
(n=12)

19.0%
(n=133)

27.7%
(n=43)

19.0%
(n=8)

43.6%
(n=17)

25.4%
(n=17)

16.1%
(n=5)

80.2%
(n=562)

83.9%
(n=130)

88.1%
(n=37)

84.6%
(n=33)

87.9%
(n=58)

80.6%
(n=25)

8.8%
(n=61)

50.3%
(n=78)

4.8%
(n=2)

15.4%
(n=6)

19.7%
(n=13)

9.7%
(n=3)

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for each race-neutral familybackground survey items. Similar to the findings in Table 2, racial or ethnic
groups were comparable on some items, yet differed on others.
African–American and biracial or multiracial participants endorsed items
related to growing up in a single-parent household, growing up on public
assistance, and having a parent who had been incarcerated more than all
other racial or ethnic groups. On the other hand, Hispanic students were
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most likely to grow up in low-income neighborhoods. White and Asian/Pacific
Islander students endorsed the fewest race-neutral family background items.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Survey Items Focused on Race-Neutral
Family Background

Grew up in
Single-Parent
Household
Raised by
Guardian
Parents Under
20 When Born
On Public
Assistance
When Growing
Up
Family Income
When in H.S.
was > 75K
Parent has
been
Incarcerated
Family
Member has
been
Incarcerated
Non-English
Routinely
Spoken when
Growing Up
Christian
Raised in
Predom.
Minority
Neighborhood
Raised in
Predom. Low
Income
Neighborhood

White

Afr/Am

Hispanic

33.5%
(n=52)

Asian/
PI
21.4%
(n=9)

20.5%
(n=8)

Bi/MultiRacial
38.5%
(n=25)

15.6%
(n=109)
2.1%
(n=15)
6.1%
(n=42)

5.8%
(n=9)
11.0%
(n=17)

14.6%
(n=100)

Other
22.6%
(n=7)

2.4%
(n=1)
2.4%
(n=1)

2.6%
(n=1)
13.2%
(n=5)

6.1%
(n=4)
13.6%
(n=9)

3.2%
(n=1)
3.2%
(n=1)

30.3%
(n=44)

12.5%
(n=5)

26.3%
(n=10)

34.5%
(n=20)

13.3%
(n=4)

60.6%
(n=418)
6.1%
(n=42)

40.3%
(n=62)
15.0%
(n=22)

47.6%
(n=20)
2.4%
(n=1)

20.5%
(n=8)
10.8%
(n=4)

50.0%
(n=33)
12.7%
(n=8)

48.4%
(n=15)
6.5%
(n=2)

14.6%
(n=100)

27.2%
(n=40)

7.7%
(n=3)

23.7%
(n=9)

18.0%
(n=11)

10.0%
(n=3)

6.0%
(n=42)

24.7%
(n=38)

85.7%
(n=36)

76.9%
(n=30)

33.3%
(n=22)

38.7%
(n=12)

82.6%
(n=579

98.1%
(n=152)

42.9%
(n=18)

84.6%
(n=30)

71.2%
(n=47)

66.7%
(n=20)

5.5%
(n=38)

54.8%
(n=80)

15.4%
(n=6)

48.6%
(n=18)

26.7%
(n=16)

17.2%
(n=5)

12.8%
(n=85)

32.6%
(n=44)

3.1%
(n=1)

36.1%
(n=13)

32.8%
(n=19)

28.6%
(n=8)

The descriptive statistics that Tables 2 and 3 present suggest a pattern
where certain racial or ethnic groups were likely to endorse race-neutral items
more than other racial or ethnic groups. However, it is difficult to state this
definitively using descriptive analyses alone. And, although there appears to
be a clear pattern in the data, it is difficult to draw meaningful inferences from
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single-item race-neutral factors. Toward this end, we conducted factor
analyses to examine whether some of the single-item race-neutral factors were
conceptually related.
The instrument this study used was a 29-item survey that measured
demographics, race-neutral aspects of the student’s identity, and attitudinal
questions about diversity in law school. We conducted factor analyses (with
varimax rotation)188 on both the race-neutral student-background and familybackground indices. Results from the factor analyses suggest that several items
on the survey were conceptually related. Thus, it is more methodologically
sound to examine these items in combined forms than as single items. Specific
results from the factor analyses show four interpretable factors for the raceneutral student-background indices: (1) financial need (i.e., qualifying for
free or reduced lunch in high school; working for pay in high school or
receiving a Pell Grant as an undergraduate); (2) high-school characteristics
(i.e., private or public); (3) family “first” status (i.e., first to graduate from a
high-school or undergraduate program, first to attend law school); and
(4) ethnic- or race-focused high school or college (i.e., attending a historically
black college or university (“HBCU”), attending a Hispanic serving
institution, contributing uncompensated services to underserved groups in
college). Thus, the single-items in Table 2 fall into one of these four
categories. For race-neutral family background indices, the factor analysis
revealed three interpretable factors: (1) family financials (i.e., parents or
guardians receiving public assistance, household income, non-English spoken
in household, neighborhood predominately racial or ethnic minority or low
income); (2) family incarceration (i.e., parents, guardian, or someone in the
immediate family has been incarcerated); and (3) family composition (i.e.,
growing up in a single-parent household, being raised by a guardian, parents
under the age of 20 when the student was born). The single items in Table 3
fall into these three categories, with the exception of religion, which was not
conceptually related to any of the other items.
The four factors for student background indices accounted for 54.8% of
the variance, and the three factors for family background indices accounted
for 55.5% of the variance. We created composite variables for each
interpretable factor in order to conduct further inferential analyses. Table 2
contains one example of a composite variable. There were four single-items
that were conceptually related: (1) qualifying for free or reduced lunch in
high school; (2) worked for pay in high school; (3) worked for pay in college;
and (4) received a Pell Grant as an undergrad. We combined these four items
and subsumed them under the single factor entitled “financial need.” For all
composite variables, higher scores indicate greater endorsement of the raceneutral indices.
Once we created the composite variables, we were able to show the mean
score ratings for each racial or ethnic group on both student-background and
family-background items. Table 4 presents the mean score differences
188. Varimax is an orthogonal rotation that significantly reduces the chances of multicollinearity between variables.
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between racial or ethnic groups on student-background indices. This table is
similar to Table 2, with the exception that it illustrates how the single-item
data from Table 2 actually tells a more complex story. These composite
variables allow for a more statistically meaningful comparison between racial
or ethnic groups.
Table 4. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on StudentBackground Indices

Financial
Needs
H.S.
Characteristics
Family First
Status
Ethnic-Focused
H.S. or College

White
3.12
(2.28)
3.71
(0.58)
1.02
(0.66)
0.19
(0.41)

Afr/Am
4.01
(2.29)
3.84
(0.46)
1.18
(0.73)
1.23
(0.97)

Asian/PI
2.39
(2.15)
3.74
(0.63)
1.12
(0.68)
0.22
(0.42)

Hispanic
4.39
(2.46)
3.72
(0.56)
1.36
(0.81)
0.74
(0.71)

F
10.48***
2.16
5.12**
141.11***

Df
3,
865
3,
927
3,
923
3,
868

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in
parentheses. H.S. denotes high school and Df denotes degrees of freedom.
We conducted a series of analyses of variance (“ANOVAs”) to determine
if the mean differences in Table 4 were significantly meaningful. As the
ANOVA analyses demonstrate, there were main effects for financial needs
[F(3, 865) = 10.48, p < .001], family-first status [F(3, 923) = 5.12, p < .01],
and ethnic-or racial-focused high schools and colleges [F(3, 868) = 141.11, p
< .001], meaning that racial or ethnic groups differed on these variables. We
conducted a Bonferonni post-hoc analysis to identify where the specific
difference existed. Post-hoc analyses revealed that African–American and
Hispanic students scored significantly higher than both white and
Asian/Pacific Islander students on financial-need indices (e.g., qualifying for
free or reduced lunch in high school) and ethnic-focused high-school or
college indices (e.g., attending an HBCU or Hispanic Serving Institution
(“HSI”)). African–American and Hispanic students also scored significantly
higher than white students on family first indices.
Table 5 shows the mean score differences between racial groups on familybackground indices. ANOVA findings reveal main effects for family financials [F(3,
800) = 32.61, p < .001], family incarceration [F(3, 895) = 7.74, p < .001], and family
composition [F(3, 920) = 11.26, p < .001]. We again used Bonferonni post-hoc
analyses to identify where differences existed. Post-hoc analyses indicate that
African–American and Hispanic students scored significantly higher than
white and Asian/Pacific Islander students on family-financial indices (e.g.,
parents or guardians received public assistance while growing up). Moreover,
African–American students scored significantly higher than both white and
Asian/Pacific Islander students on family-incarceration indices, and they
scored significantly higher than white students on family-composition indices
(e.g., growing up in a single-parent household).
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Table 5. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on
Family-Background Indices
Family
Financials
Family
Incarceration
Family
Composition

White
2.99
(2.08)
0.20
(0.52)
0.23
(0.51)

Afr/Am
4.81
(2.77)
0.43
(0.71)
0.50
(0.66)

Asian/PI
3.24
(1.84)
0.10
(0.38)
0.26
(0.45)

Hispanic
5.44
92.91)
0.32
(0.67)
0.37
(0.63)

F
32.61***
7.74***
11.26***

Df
3,
800
3,
895
3,
920

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in
parentheses. H.S. denotes high school and Df denotes degrees of freedom.
Four questions on the survey measured students’ attitudes about diversity
in law school. Table 6 shows the mean differences between racial or ethnic
groups on these variables. We conducted a series of ANOVAs to determine if
there were significant differences between racial or ethnic groups on these
attitudinal indices. ANOVA findings revealed that there were main effects for
students’ attitudes about racial diversity improving students’ educational
experiences [F(3, 927) = 16.30, p < .001], and for attitudes about
socioeconomic diversity improving students’ educational outcomes [F(3,
927) = 6.40, p < .001], suggesting that significant differences existed between
the racial or ethnic groups. Post-hoc analyses showed that African–American
and Hispanic students scored significantly higher than white students on both
of these indices. However, there were no significant differences between racial
or ethnic groups on attitudes about diversity of students’ experiences and
diversity of students’ viewpoints being important.
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Table 6. Mean Differences Between Racial or Ethnic Groups on
Diversity Perspectives

Racial
Diversity is
Important
SES
Diversity is
Important
Diversity of
Student
Experience
Important
Diversity of
Student
Viewpoint
Important

White
3.65
(1.01)

Afr/Am
4.23
(1.20)

Asian/PI
4.02
(1.05)

Hispanic
4.21
(0.88)

F
16.30***

Df
3,
927

3.84
(1.01)

4.23
(1.22)

3.93
(1.14)

4.13
(0.88)

6.40***

3,
927

4.01
(0.90)

4.04
(1.07)

4.05
(0.88)

4.05
(0.71)

0.07

3,
911

4.35
(0.86)

4.36
(1.17)

4.24
(1.10)

4.53
(0.61)

0.67

3,
927

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Standard deviation appears in
parentheses. Df denotes degrees of freedom.
VI.

OBSERVATIONS

This study sought to examine the following research question: Is there a
relationship between law school students’ racial or ethnic backgrounds and
their willingness to endorse race-neutral identity factors? Our findings suggest
that, in the face of constitutional uncertainty, using race-neutral factors may
enable law schools to maintain current levels of racial diversity without
considering race in the admissions process. In this study, African–American
and Hispanic students were significantly more likely than both white and
Asian/Pacific Islander students to endorse race-neutral factors such as
qualifying for free or reduced lunch programs in K–12 education, working
for pay for 10 or more hours while enrolled in high school or an
undergraduate program, receiving a Pell Grant during their undergraduate
education, attending a high school where racial minorities comprised the
majority of the student body, attending HBCUs or HSIs, and having a parent
or guardian who received public assistance when they were a dependent
minor. Moreover, African–American students in this study endorsed more
race-neutral factors than other students, which suggests that using raceneutral factors may be particularly important for maintaining the current
levels of African–American students in public law schools.
The findings of this study suggest that there is room for this type of raceblind yet race-conscious experimentation by law schools. For law schools in
jurisdictions that ban higher-education institutions from considering race in
their admissions, they may be able to use the identity factors identified in this
study to improve their yield of non-white diverse students. For law schools in
jurisdictions that permit higher-education institutions to use race in their
admissions, the study provides one tool that law schools could use to test
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whether a race-neutral admission cycle could yield a critical mass of racial and
ethnic minority students from groups that are underrepresented in law
schools and the legal profession.
Of course, the findings reported in this study are based on aggregated
data collected only from the law schools participating in it. Consequently, law
schools that presently consider race in admissions, yet struggle to achieve even
low levels of diversity, may suffer a loss in diversity if they stop considering race
in their quest to achieve racial diversity in their classrooms and campus
community. Law schools that presently enjoy significant racial diversity in
their student bodies might consider experimenting with a race-blind
admissions cycle by asking questions on their applications related to the
interpretable identity factors presented in the findings of this study in lieu of
asking about race. For law schools in jurisdictions that permit highereducation institutions to consider race in their admissions, conducting raceblind admission cycles will provide them with diversity yield rates that can be
compared to previous years when they did consider race. If the race-neutral
admissions cycle yielded significantly less diversity than the diversity achieved
in years when they did consider race, then the law schools would have
documented proof that they “considered” race-neutral alternatives before
resorting to using race, and that they could not achieve comparable diversity
using race-blind means. Given the Supreme Court’s heightened scrutiny of
universities’ consideration of race in their admissions decisions,189 possessing
such information may be critical to defending race conscious affirmativeaction plans against future constitutional challenges.
It is important to note that, with but a few exceptions, the overwhelming
majority of the law schools that we surveyed had a paucity of racial diversity
within their first-year student bodies. This, more than anything, speaks to the
pressing need for law schools to continue being proactive about increasing
racial diversity in their student populations. A lack of racial diversity can
desensitize students to the importance of having racial diversity in the
classroom. Our findings revealed ideological and attitudinal differences
between racial groups on perspectives about the role of diversity in law
schools, suggesting that racial diversity continues to be something that law
schools must strive to achieve in order to have diverse perspectives in
classrooms. Our study provides an avenue for how affirmative action in the
law school context can be race-blind and therefore “race-neutral” by not
asking applicants about their race, yet be race-conscious by having an
admissions structure that is mindful of inclusivity and racial diversity.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Considering that law schools serve a unique role in American society and
“represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders,”190
it is vital to the future of our democracy that students from historically

189.
190.

See supra Part III.B.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
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underrepresented racial groups continue to have access to legal education.
As this Article discussed, the ability of law schools to continue to provide such
access through the use of race-conscious admissions plans is quite
uncertain.191 Coupled with the profound lack of racial diversity currently
plaguing the legal profession,192 law schools’ experimentation with raceneutral admissions criteria—such as those identity factors tested in our
study—is both a timely and necessary endeavor. Engaging in this endeavor is
crucial if we are to fulfill our commitment and duty to educate all law students
in diverse learning environments and to provide students from diverse
backgrounds greater access to legal education and the legal profession.

191.
192.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.

